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Introduction 
The Nanjing Massacre in 1937 is considered by both Chinese and international scholars 
to be one of the most horrific atrocities committed by the Japanese military during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War. Although the Japanese had been nibbling away at Northeastern China for 
some time, starting with the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and focused mainly in 
Manchuria, the Second Sino-Japanese War (in Chinese, 抗日战争, or the War of Japanese 
Resistance) is considered by many to have started after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 
1937. This Incident led to the break-out of full-scale war between China and Japan. By August, 
the Japanese military had advanced as far as Shanghai. The Battle of Shanghai was one of the 
longest, bloodiest battles in the War of Japanese Resistance. Although fighting began in 
Shanghai on August 13
th
, it did not end until the end of November, over four months later.  
 After suffering devastating losses from the Battle of Shanghai, the Japanese army 
determined to march on the Nationalist capital of China, Nanjing, where Chiang Kaishek’s 
government was located. Having expected an easy victory in Shanghai, the Japanese military 
was angered and frustrated by the toll the battle took on their soldiers. In their frenzied march 
from Shanghai to Nanjing, the Japanese soldiers killed and looted in the name of conquering 
Nanjing and eventually forcing Chinese surrender. By the time the soldiers reached the city, they 
were hungry for goods, women, and revenge.
1
 
 On December 13, 1937, the Japanese troops entered the city of Nanjing. The 
preconditions for disaster were further augmented by the Nationalist Army, whose chaotic, 
cowardly retreat from the city not only left Nanjing’s civilian population defenseless, but also 
stranded around 100,000 troops. These Nationalist troops disguised themselves in civilian 
                                                          
1
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clothing to blend in with the crowds, making it difficult at times to distinguish between the 
combatant and the noncombatant.
2
   
When the city fell, those who remained in Nanjing and in the surrounding area were 
subjected to what Chinese-American author Iris Chang has dubbed “six weeks of horror.”3 The 
first six weeks of the Japanese occupation are considered the most concentrated period of the 
atrocities committed by the Japanese soldiers against the civilians of Nanjing. The Nanjing 
Massacre is most well-known for the slaughter and rape of many thousands of Chinese civilian 
non-combatants. Although the exact number is still contested, most scholars concur that the total 
number of Chinese victims (including both civilians and soldiers) was on the scale of hundreds 
of thousands; the official Chinese government figure, which is prominently displayed at the 
Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall in Nanjing, is 300,000. Civilians were not merely killed; they 
were often killed in brutal, inhumane fashions: 
Among the mass killings, in addition to those who died by the sword and firing squad, others 
were burned, buried alive, or drowned. Several, after being soaked with gasoline, were set on 
fire by gunshot, causing the wounded person to lie covered in flames, rolling and writhing 
underground, until finally dying a miserable death. Individual, sporadic acts of torture and killing 
included splitting, gutting, slicing, piercing alive, and dog biting. Some were even burned with 
acid and then left, burning all over. Others were tortured to death. Two Japanese lieutenants 
amused themselves by having a killing contest. The first one to reach 100 killed won the “game.” 
Then they raised the limit to 150. In addition to killing, the Nanking Massacre also involved rape, 
arson, theft, and other violent crimes. The Japanese troops who attacked Nanking raped tens of 
thousands of women, many of whom were then murdered.
4
 
The innumerable rapes by Japanese troops led to another well-known name for the Nanjing 
Massacre: the Rape of Nanking.  
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 The Nanjing Massacre was by no means an isolated occurrence, but rather one of many 
atrocities committed by the Japanese military in conquered areas of China during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War.
5
 Such wartime atrocities are by no means limited to the Japanese, but are a 
stain on the written history of humanity as a whole. When looking at atrocities such as the 
Nanjing Massacre, it is all too easy to slip into demonizing the Japanese. This is a dangerous 
tendency, though, because it is unfair to blame an entire ethnic group
6
 for the evils committed by 
a small subsection of the population. Unfortunately, the propaganda in China’s Patriotic 
Education Campaign has often erred on the side of over-generalizing “the Japanese,” which is a 
dangerous trap to fall into.
7
 
 It is often the case that a specific historical event will take on a symbolic meaning that is 
greater than the objective details of the event itself. Such has been the case with the Nanjing 
Massacre. It is the Nanjing Massacre, rather than any other atrocity in the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, that has evolved into a powerful, modern-day symbol of Japanese military aggression in 
Chinese national rhetoric. In the 1990s, the Nanjing Massacre was utilized as an important 
symbol in China’s Patriotic Education Campaign, initiated by Jiang Zemin in 1994 through the 
CCP (Chinese Communist Party)’s Propaganda Department. Through creating a stronger 
correlation between the Nanjing Massacre and Japanese aggression, Jiang Zemin contributed to 
                                                          
5
 Other symbolic atrocities include massacres in other Chinese cities , the “three alls” campaign, Unit 731 and other 
biological experiments, the “comfort women” issue, etc. – The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography, Ed. 
Joshua A. Fogel (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2000), 24 
6
 Japan is more ethnically homogenous than most nations. Thus, when I say the “Japanese,” I am referring to both 
the Japanese ethnic group and the Japanese nation. (Different ethnic groups do exist, such as the Ainu in the north, 
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7
 As European studies scholar Charles S. Maier writes in his forward to Fogel’s The Nanjing Massacre in History and 
Historiography (ix), “Historians should remain distrustful of any easy generalization concerning nations as a whole. 
Modern nations represent communities of debate and dissent united by language or by shared tensions over 
language; by a sense of shared, though often contested, history; by a partial commitment, though again contested, 
to redistribute some material resources among citizens; and ultimately by some unitary representation in the 
world of states. When it comes to what nations think and believe, we generalize at our peril.”  
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the decline of Sino-Japanese relations during his term as President of the PRC (People’s 
Republic of China). 
 The historiography of the Nanjing Massacre is not just about the past, but equally about 
the present. When I use the term “historiography,” I mean the collective body of materials 
through which the Massacre has been interpreted from 1938 until the present. Not only does this 
historiography include the work of historians and journalists, but also entertainment, such as 
novels and films; physical sites, such as the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall; educational 
resources, such as textbooks, documentaries, and even websites; and even government-initiated 
propaganda. My understanding of historiography follows that of China scholar Michael Berry, 
whose research for A History of Pain: Trauma in Modern Chinese Literature and Film is based 
on the premise “that fiction, film, and other popular media play an important and fundamental 
role in shaping popular conceptions and imaginations of history and, in this case, historical 
atrocity.” 8 
Historiography is always biased by the sociopolitical circumstances surrounding the 
person or group interpreting the historical event. In turn, the historiography of an event can have 
a significant impact on the present. As European studies scholar Charles S. Maier puts it, 
“Historical self-reflection cannot escape politics and will always be deeply affected by it because 
different versions of the past are so important for legitimating claims on power in the present.” 9 
However, I take this idea a step further: I believe that not only is historiography influenced by the 
present, but that it also influences the present. In the case of the Nanjing Massacre, its 
historiography in mainland China – most of which has been controlled by the CCP – has had a 
significant effect on both how the Chinese people view the Japanese and, subsequently, on 
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international relations
10
 between China and Japan. I will take the above quote describing the 
inhumane slaughter of civilians in the Nanjing Massacre as an example. 
The above quote is part of a book entitled Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing that was 
an outgrowth of the Princeton University Nanking 1937 Conference. The conference was held on 
November 22, 1997, and was one of the first scholarly events in the United States to address the 
Nanjing Massacre.
11
 Chinese, Japanese, and American scholars at the conference presented a 
wide range of viewpoints concerning the Massacre. Nanking 1937 contains articles written by 
these various scholars divided into four sections – Nanking in a Global Context, Revisiting 
Nanking: Views from China and Japan, Remembering Nanking, and Healing the Wounds. The 
above quote is part of an article entitled “Causes of the Nanjing Massacre” (part of 
Remembering Nanking) by Sun Zhaiwei. Sun is a renowned Chinese historian at the Jiangsu 
Academy of Social Sciences and the editor-in-chief of the book 南京大屠杀 [The Nanking 
Massacre], a collection of Chinese scholarly views on the Massacre which was published in 
Beijing in 1997. In his article, Sun provides a detailed analysis of both the direct and indirect 
causes of the Nanjing Massacre. 
Taking the historical context into account, how can we interpret the above quote in light 
of what we know about the author and the sociopolitical circumstances that surrounded him as he 
wrote? First, Sun Zhaiwei is a widely recognized Nanjing Massacre historical scholar in 
mainland China, and his arguments are representative of those of the mainland Chinese scholarly 
community.
12
 Since he was the editor-in-chief of an influential book on the Massacre published 
in mainland China, we can assume that his views reflect the CCP officially-sanctioned view of 
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the Massacre. This is because scholarly work published in China, especially when it deals with 
politically sensitive topics, is censored for consistency with official truth claims.
13
 Since Sun’s 
research was conducted in the 1990s, we can also assume that he was influenced by Jiang’s 
Patriotic Education Campaign according to circumstances I will explain further below. 
An integral part of the Patriotic Education Campaign was the teaching of history in a 
manner to promote nationalism; thus, this affected how Japanese military atrocities were 
presented in popular media and in the classroom. To promote nationalism among the youth, more 
time was spent in class learning about modern Chinese history and the Century of Humiliation, 
particularly the Second Sino-Japanese War.
14
 As part of this, Japanese military atrocities in 
general and the Nanjing Massacre in particular were elaborated on and emphasized more in both 
the classroom and in the public sphere than they had been previously. Sun describes the 
inhumane actions of the Japanese soldiers in the Nanjing Massacre in horrific and nuanced detail, 
which is a representative depiction of the Massacre in the contemporary Chinese scholarly 
community during the 1990s. 
Sun’s research on the historical details of the Nanjing Massacre has been widely 
accredited in mainland China. In one of his most influential works of research, “The Nanking 
Massacre and the Nanking Population,” he asserts that the death toll in Nanjing was even greater 
than 300,000, the official number of victims adhered to by the Chinese government. Not only 
was Sun’s work influential in the perceptions of the Nanjing Massacre in mainland China, but 
also in the international community. His research was cited in Iris Chang’s Rape of Nanking, 
which was also published in 1997 and contributed to a greater awareness of the Massacre in the 
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West. In fact, Chang heavily relies on Sun’s research, and considers him to have conducted the 
most thorough study of the death toll in Nanjing.
15
  
A scholarly work based on a historical event can have a strong influence on other 
scholarly works, such as Sun’s research did on Chang’s book. Furthermore, it can have a 
significant effect on both public opinion and, indirectly, government responses. For instance, less 
than a month after Sun had presented his research at Princeton, he also participated in a 
conference in Tokyo, “How to Perceive the Nanking Massacre: Verifications by Japanese, 
Chinese, and American Researchers,” on December 13-14, 1997. Since 1997 was the 60th 
anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, it was quite a sensitive year for Sino-Japanese relations, 
particularly in light of the fact that by 1996, relations between China and Japan were already at 
an all-time low since the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 1972.
16
 As I will discuss 
throughout this thesis, the historiographical depictions of the 1937 Nanjing Massacre during the 
1990s shaped both international perspectives on the Massacre and Sino-Japanese relations during 
and after this period. 
 In writing about China and Japan’s complex relationship, when I use the term 
“international relations,” I am referring to more than the traditional realist interpretation of 
international relations,
 17
 which rather simplistically boils international relations down to the 
formal diplomatic relations between one state and another – in this case, between China and 
Japan. Although diplomatic relations are certainly important, I view international relations as a 
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 Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 
1997), 100. 
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 Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 165. 
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Dark, Introduction to International Relations: Problems and Perspectives (New York: Manchester University Press, 
2001), 5   
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wider term, closer to the constructivist theory,
18
 as a social construct that encompasses not only 
the state but also the individual and non-governmental groups. I believe an important component 
of international relations between two nations is how the peoples of two nations perceive the 
“other” – in this case, how the Chinese people view the Japanese people, and vice versa. As I 
will show, public attitudes have a powerful, often unintentional effect on diplomatic relations 
that cannot be taken lightly. 
 Historiography is not static, but evolves constantly. In the case of the Nanjing Massacre, 
from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949 to present, the 
Nanjing Massacre has been utilized for different political agendas in China, not only to heighten 
Chinese nationalism vis-à-vis Japan, but also vis-à-vis other nations. For instance, during the 
Korean War, Chinese propaganda utilized the Nanjing Massacre to promote anti-American 
sentiments, claiming that Americans who remained in Nanjing during the winter of 1937 chose 
to protect their property over protecting Chinese lives.
19
 In the 1960s, the PRC government 
utilized the Nanjing Massacre to attack the Guomindang government in Taiwan, recalling the 
cowardice of the Guomindang troops as they abandoned the civilians of Nanjing in the face of 
the Japanese invasion.
20
 During this decade, the government also chose not to publicize details of 
the Massacre. Namely, this was because as a young nation that had just rid itself of foreign 
encroachment, the PRC did not want to promote a victim mentality, but rather a strong mentality 
                                                          
18
 The constructivist theory in international relations developed more recently than the realist school, and involves 
the individual actor as well as the state. Different actors have different interests and objectives that influence 
international relations, and can be found in many different societal spheres – not only in government, but also in 
education, scholarly circles, the media, literary circles, etc.: “Constructivists see [society] as a constitutive realm, 
the site that generates actors as knowledgeable social and political agents, the realm that makes them who they 
are…they emphasize the social determinants of social and political agency and action.” – Scott Burchill, et. al., 
Theories of International Relations (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 199 
19
 The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography.  Ed. Joshua A. Fogel. (Berkely, California: University of 
California Press, 2000), 24. 
20
 Fogel, 26 
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that emphasized revolutionary progress.
21
 This can be contrasted with the 1980s and 1990s, 
when the PRC had begun its economic development under Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door Policy 
and was no longer an unstable, fledgling nation.  
    The Nanjing Massacre became a notable part of the PRC’s nationalist rhetoric in the 
1980s with events such as the 1982 Textbook Controversy and the 1985 protests triggered by the 
fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II.
22
 As part of the commemoration of this fortieth 
anniversary, the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall was opened on August 15, 1985.
23
 This was a 
significant step in the historiography of the Nanjing Massacre, and it represented the 
government’s official view on the Massacre. Although the Memorial was created to 
commemorate the past, it was also intricately linked to both domestic and international politics in 
the 1980s.
 24
 On a domestic level, the ultimate focus of the Memorial was (and still remains) to 
connect the nation’s past to the present leadership of the Communist Party and to promote 
national loyalty through patriotic education.
25
 As the symbol of past Japanese military aggression, 
the Massacre became a focal point for anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese public.    
 Although anti-Japanese protests increased in China during the 1980s, the Chinese public 
ended up focusing their protests on the shortcomings of their own government, ultimately 
culminating in the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989. As a result of Tiananmen, Deng 
Xiaoping’s political reputation was damaged, and he retired from the political scene in 1992. The 
following year, on March 27, 1993, Jiang Zemin became the president of the PRC. During the 
Jiang era, from 1993 to 2002, Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated significantly due to a number 
of factors, including China’s hardened stance on Taiwan, China’s continued nuclear tests, the 
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 Shirk, 160. 
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 Fogel, 34. 
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25
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Diaoyu Islands territorial dispute, and China’s stance against Japan becoming a permanent 
member on the UN security council. Keeping all of these factors in mind, however, I am focused 
on the Patriotic Education Campaign and how it created a stronger correlation between the 
Nanjing Massacre and Japanese aggression in the Chinese popular psyche. The campaign led to 
increasing anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese public, and in turn, Sino-Japanese 
diplomatic tensions were also exacerbated. 
 My initial interest in the Nanjing Massacre began when I read Iris Chang’s The Rape of 
Nanking as I was flying to Beijing to study abroad for a year. Although I have since come to 
realize that her book has multiple flaws,
26
  I still consider it as an important starting point for my 
research on the historiography of the Massacre. After reading through The Rape of Nanking, I 
decided to do research in Beijing on how the Nanjing Massacre had evolved into such a strong 
symbol of Japanese cruelty, particularly in mainland China. The main component of my research 
was through interviews: I interviewed multiple Chinese college-aged students in Beijing. The 
purpose of my research was to gauge the relevance of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the 
Nanjing Massacre for the younger Chinese generation. In my interviews, I asked students various 
questions concerning their education on the Nanjing Massacre and the impact of popular media 
on their views. My results showed that there was a strong emphasis on both the Nanjing 
Massacre and Japanese military aggression in both Chinese primary and secondary education. 
After reading The Rape of Nanking, I read more serious scholarly books dealing with the 
historiography of the Nanjing Massacre from the perspectives of American, Chinese, and 
Japanese scholars. Of particular use to me were the works of Joshua Fogel, Takashi Yoshida, and 
Susan Shirk. Most of my research has been conducted in English; however, although I have not 
used many Chinese language sources, all of my interviews in Beijing were conducted in 
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Mandarin, which has helped shape my understanding of Sino-Japanese relations in the context of 
Chinese linguistic and cultural practices.  
My thesis is interdisciplinary, dealing with the overlap between multiple different fields: 
international relations, domestic politics, historiography, literature and film, and education. The 
historical scope of this research is China from the Second Sino-Japanese War to the present. 
However, my specific focus is China in the 1990s. The overall goal for my paper is to more fully 
understand how the Nanjing Massacre has become such a potent focal point for anti-Japanese 
sentiments in China, and how this in turn has impacted Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.  
 The first chapter will give an overview of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang 
Zemin’s respective approaches to Sino-Japanese relations. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the 
historiographical developments for the Nanjing Massacre, both in scholarly circles and in 
popular media, in the 1980s and 1990s. The rise of the Patriotic Education Campaign and the 
strengthening of the correlation between the Nanjing Massacre and Japanese military aggression 
will also be included as part of this section. Chapter 3 will take a closer look at Sino-Japanese 
relations as a whole in the 1990s and how the Nanjing Massacre fits into this.  
 
Chapter I: Jiang Zemin and His Predecessors 
To understand why Jiang Zemin’s approach to relations with Japan in the 1990s was 
noteworthy, it is essential to compare his approach to that of his predecessors, Mao Zedong and 
Deng Xiaoping. Unlike Jiang, who in his focus on domestic politics largely neglected diplomatic 
relations with Japan, both Mao and Deng were very intentional in building positive Sino-
Japanese diplomatic relations: Mao mainly for political reasons and Deng mainly for economic 
reasons. 
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There were strong anti-Japanese sentiments during the Mao era (1949-1976), particularly 
among the older generation, who still had bitter, painful memories of the Japanese occupation 
that had wrought such destruction. However, Mao was such a strong leader that he could control 
these public sentiments. Thus, even though those in Mao’s generation had the most reason to 
hate the Japanese, during  the Mao era (1949 to 1976), Mao and his premier, Zhou Enlai, 
promoted peaceful and friendly relations with Japan, as Susan Shirk notes. During the 1950s, 
when the Cold War was in full swing, Mao and Zhou sought good relations with Japan as a 
counterbalance against the United States.
27
 In the 1970s, after relations with the Soviets had 
spiraled downward, Mao sought to use Japan as a counterbalance against the USSR. Indeed, 
during the Mao era, Sino-Japanese friendship was a major theme in political education and 
media propaganda.
28
 If Mao needed to mobilize the public against an international threat, he 
would target the United States or the Soviet Union as scapegoats, but never Japan.
29
 Good 
relations with Japan were seen as crucial as a ‘buffer’ to Western imperialism and, later, Soviet-
style communism. 
Since Mao was a powerful figurehead for the Chinese populace, what he said was 
followed; thus, when Mao stressed good relations with Japan as a high-level political decision, 
this decision was followed by the public. For example, in August of 1955, PRC delegates 
participated in the first World Rally against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held in Hiroshima. 
The PRC donated 7.2 million yen to help cover the costs of the event. In 1972, when diplomatic 
relations were normalized between China and Japan, Mao did not seek an apology from Japan 
for the atrocities committed during the Second Sino-Japanese War as necessary; he believed that 
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forcing a generation of Japanese to shoulder the indemnity from a war they did not commit was 
unfair.
30
  
In the September 29
th
-30
th
1972 joint communiqué, the Japanese side expressed that it was 
“keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the 
Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.”31 Apparently, in the original wording 
of the apology, stated by Japanese Prime Minister Kakukei Tanaka in a 1972 dinner speech in 
Beijing, Tanaka had apologized for the “big trouble”32 Japan had brought China during the war. 
Mao and Zhou were not happy with this wording, because they believed it did not emphasize the 
Japanese atrocities enough. However, the following day, they were able to persuade the 
Japanese-then foreign minister, Ōhira Masayoshi, to change the wording of the statement to 
acknowledge Japan’s war responsibility.33 After this apology, neither Mao nor Zhou considered 
it necessary for Japan to make any further verbal concessions. There were few publications on 
the Second Sino-Japanese War in the 1970s precisely because Chinese leaders had instructed 
scholars to steer clear of this sensitive historical topic.
34
 Mao and Zhou’s approach can be 
strongly contrasted with Jiang’s: Jiang both aggressively emphasized the history issue in the 
Patriotic Education Campaign throughout his term
35
 and vigorously sought an official apology 
from Japan during his 1998 diplomatic visit to Tokyo.
36
 The fact that the Chinese leaders one, 
renounced China’s demands for war reparations from Japan and, two, were able to convince the 
                                                          
30
 Shirk, 158 
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 “Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China,” 
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 Shirk, 296 
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 Wan, 89 
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 Wan, 89 
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 Kazuo Sato, “The Japan-China Summit and Joint Declaration of 1998: A Watershed for Japan-China Relations in 
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Japanese representatives to change the wording of their apology showed a remarkable ability to 
reach compromise that is largely absent in Sino-Japanese government interactions today. 
 Like Mao, Deng was a confident and dynamic leader; he prioritized Sino-Japanese 
relations and quelled anti-Japanese sentiments amongst the public. Deng also had great political 
authority during his term in office and good reason for positive, stable relations with Japan. 
However, in contrast to Mao, Deng’s motivation was more economic than political: Deng saw 
China’s relationship with Japan as essential for his economic reforms to succeed. When Deng 
promoted his Open-Door Policy, Japan was considered a model example to follow for economic 
reform. Japan’s “economic miracle”37 created a very positive image in China at the time; Japan 
was considered an “Asian economic and technological tiger worthy of emulation.”38 Japan’s 
economic success gave great hope to the Chinese, who saw their East Asian neighbor’s success 
story as something that should be aspired to in their own country. Deng became the first Chinese 
leader to visit Japan in December 1978, shortly before he announced his economic reforms, and 
later visited Japan for a second time. In the early 1980s, Deng initiated an effort to invite a few 
influential Japanese to advise the PRC’s economic modernization, and created the Sino-Japanese 
Economic Knowledge Exchange Association. During the Deng era, a Sino-Japanese agreement 
to increase trade was signed, as well as a Treaty of Peace and Friendship.
39
 
There were certainly anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese public in the 1980s. 
Public antagonism toward Japan noticeably began in 1982, the year that the history issue –
Chinese concern over contemporary Japanese attitudes toward the Second Sino-Japanese War – 
became a defining factor in Sino-Japanese relations.
40
 First, in 1982, the Chinese public was 
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angered by what is known as the first Japanese Textbook Controversy. This controversy centered 
on the Japanese Ministry of Education’s alleged approval of the change of the verb invaded in 
the phrase “the Japanese invaded northern China” to the phrase “advanced into” in Japanese 
textbooks. In addition, atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre were blamed on the resistance of 
the local populace.
41
 Unlike in the 1970s, by 1982, the CCP allowed Chinese scholars to publish 
sensitive research on the Second Sino-Japanese War, which led to a greater awareness of 
historical issues among the Chinese public. Testimonies from survivors of the war, including 
those who had lived through the Nanjing Massacre, were frequently publicized in Renmin Ribao 
(People’s Daily), along with almost daily articles on the Textbook Controversy.42 This would 
push the history issue to the front of Chinese government’s agenda.43 The following year, in 
1983, a joint statement issued by the Propaganda Department and the Research Office of the 
Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee called for a renewed emphasis on patriotic education 
for the people of China.
44
  
 The second event triggering a strong anti-Japanese reaction among the Chinese public 
was on September 18
th
, 1985. What started as school ceremonies in Beijing commemorating the 
anniversary of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria quickly devolved into a march to Tiananmen 
Square. Chinese demonstrators had been angered by the Japanese Textbook Controversy and by 
the Japanese Prime Minister at the time, Nakasone Yasuhiro’s, visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.45 
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However, Deng kept his cool, and he met with Nakasone a few weeks later, on October 10
th
, to 
ensure that the student demonstrations would not harm Sino-Japanese friendship. It is speculated 
that a “gentlemen’s agreement” of sorts was reached between Deng and Nakasone: if Nakasone 
would cease to visit the Shrine, China would not condemn visits to the Shrine by lesser-known 
Japanese officials.
46
 In addition, Nakasone was willing to order the Ministry of Education to 
revise the offending phraseology in the textbooks. As with the compromises reached during the 
1972 Joint Communiqué with Mao and Tanaka, Deng and Nakasone’s compromise showed that 
both sides highly valued good relations. 
Another flare-up in Sino-Japanese relations had to do with the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands. 
The islands, which are northeast of Taiwan and lie between China and Japan, have been argued 
over since the early twentieth century. However, after offshore oil explorations began in the 
1970s, the islands became much more valuable, and the territorial dispute became more 
volatile.
47
 Both sides agreed that in order to preserve good relations with Japan, it would be 
better to leave the issue untouched. Deng believed that the issue would be better left for the next 
generation, perhaps in 10 years or so, when tensions would hopefully have cooled.
48
 Ironically, 
when the issue again came to the forefront in the 1990s under Jiang, it became even more 
volatile. Neither the Chinese nor Japanese side was as willing to negotiate as they had been in the 
1970s.  
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Jiang Zemin was not as powerful or dynamic a leader as Mao or Deng, who had been 
revolutionary leaders. Thus, he relied heavily on popular nationalism to legitimize the state under 
his leadership. Whereas during the Mao and Deng eras, the state had a great ideological hold 
over society, during the Jiang era, the state’s role relative to society was weakened due to both 
less charismatic party leadership and political reforms.
49
 It was during the Jiang era that Sino-
Japanese relations really started to deteriorate. With the Tiananmen crisis of 1989 and worries 
about challenges from rival leaders, since Jiang had succeeded Deng as a compromise choice in 
the CCP, Jiang was much more sensitive to popular public opinion than his predecessors had 
been.
50
 Under Mao and Deng, communism was the dominant ideology that legitimized the state. 
In contrast, under Jiang, Chinese nationalism – loyalty to one’s country and one’s people – 
became the dominant ideology.
51
 Chinese popular nationalism is decidedly anti-Japanese in 
nature due to historical issues from the Second Sino-Japanese War. Because of this, the 
nationalist political strategy initiated under Jiang’s Patriotic Education Campaign has had an 
adverse effect on China’s Japan policy.52      
In order to understand Jiang’s actions in the 1990s and their impact in the sociopolitical 
context of Chinese society at the time, it is necessary to consider Jiang’s personal background. 
He was born on August 17, 1926 in Yangzhou, a city in Jiangsu Province, to an intellectual 
family. As such, he grew up during Japan’s occupation of China. He was only 11 years old when 
the Japanese attacked Nanjing, and his memories of his teenage years would have been of war. 
When World War II ended in 1945, he was already a young man. His uncle, Jiang Shangqing, 
died in World War II fighting for the CCP against the Japanese and was considered a national 
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revolutionary hero. Since Jiang Zemin’s uncle’s family was left without a male heir, Jiang’s 
father allowed him to be adopted by his uncle’s family, and there is no doubt Jiang was greatly 
influenced by his uncle’s legacy. It is commonly believed, both in China and in Japan, that 
Jiang’s personal experiences with the Japanese military during the Second Sino-Japanese War 
shaped his intense dislike of both Japan and the Japanese.
53
 This strong dislike is clearly visible 
in the Patriotic Education Campaign, where anti-Japanese nationalism is stressed.  
 Jiang first attended university in the Department of Electrical Engineering at the National 
Central University in Nanjing while it was still under Japanese occupation. He was later 
transferred to Shanghai Jiaotong University and graduated there. Although his time in Nanjing 
was not more than a few years, the destruction wrought by the Japanese in the city must have left 
a powerful impression on his young mind. The Nanjing Massacre was not promulgated by the 
Chinese government as a symbol of Japanese aggression until the 1980s, but Jiang was most 
likely conscious of the atrocity before this point in time. Considering his background, it is not 
coincidental that his Patriotic Education Campaign in the 90s strongly emphasized the Nanjing 
Massacre as a symbol of Japanese aggression. 
 In his early career, Jiang’s focus was technical administration; in the 1950s, he even spent 
a year in the USSR to study the Soviet automobile industry. However, in the 1980s, his career 
shifted to a focus on government. He was the mayor of Shanghai from June 1985 to July 1989. 
Jiang became the secretary general of the CCP promptly after the Tiananmen Massacre, although 
his real power was not apparent until the 1990s after he became president of the PRC.
54
     
When Jiang was the mayor of Shanghai in the 1980s, he had to deal with many of the 
anti-Japanese protests that were triggered in urban centers (such as Beijing and Shanghai) across 
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the country in response to events such as the Textbook Controversy and the fiftieth anniversary 
of the end of World War II. His confrontations with the protestors were often face-to-face, as 
was the case in December 1986, when he spoke at his alma mater, Jiaotong University. In an 
effort to halt anti-Japanese student protests, Jiang addressed the students with a recitation of the 
Gettysburg Address in English. The student reception of Jiang’s speech was hostile, to say the 
least, and they accused him of “spouting empty platitudes.”55 Jiang’s experience with strong anti-
Japanese nationalism, particularly among the student protestors, when he was mayor of Shanghai 
might have made him more sensitive to and fearful of public nationalism during his term as the 
president of the PRC during the 1990s. This sensitivity can also be attributed to the fact that as a 
compromise choice in the CCP to succeed Deng, Jiang was also very concerned about potential 
rivalries from other leaders within the Party.
56
    
The Tiananmen Massacre also strongly influenced Jiang and his Patriotic Education 
Campaign. Of the 1980s protests that snowballed into the Tiananmen Crisis, 1985 was 
dominated by anti-Japanese student protests (triggered by the fiftieth anniversary of World War 
II, the Textbook Controversy, and Nakasone’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine), which focused on 
rebutting Japanese militarism and the “second occupation,” which referred to the domination of 
Japanese goods in the foreign products sold in Chinese markets.
57
 Although Deng was able to 
suppress the protests in a way that appeared to do no damage to either Sino-Japanese diplomatic 
relations or domestic sentiments toward the CCP, there were in fact repercussions.  
After the mid-80s, while Deng started to take a more hard-line approach to Japan, CCP 
General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang continued to stress a softer, more 
                                                          
55
 Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1991), 300. 
56
 Shirk, 164 
57
 Shirk, 160 
 
 
21 
 
moderate approach of engaging Japan. Nakasone’s visit to Yasukuni in 1985 triggered an inner-
Party struggle as Party members disagreed on how to best approach China’s Japan policy. The 
timing of the protests, which were right before the shift in China’s Japan policy, suggests that 
public opinion has, indeed, played an important role in influencing political decisions in China 
on Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.
58
 As scholar Yinan He aptly observes, since harmonious 
relations with Japan was one of the major components on which Hu had built his career, the 1985 
protests adversely affected Hu’s leadership in the Party. 59 William Callahan concurs:  
This case suggests that in periods of elite division and bilateral tensions, public opinion can 
become politically significant for China’s Japan policy. The 1985 protests also marked the 
first time in the reform era that China’s nationalist rhetoric on Japan’s wartime invasion had 
contributed to anti-Japan demonstrations. It would not be the last.
60
  
 
In 1986, there was a second round of student protests – this time, however, the students’ 
target was not Japan, but rather their own government. They resented the fact that their anti-
Japanese protests in 1985 and 1986 had never been reported by the press, and spoke out for 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press in China. Angered by this second round of protests, 
Deng, who had originally supported Hu’s stance on Sino-Japanese relations, shifted to the more 
conservative faction.
61
 As an outspoken proponent of Sino-Japanese relations, Hu’s viewpoints 
ultimately contributed to his political demise.
62
 Only two years after the initial protests, on 
January 16, 1987, Hu’s resignation was accepted by the CCP Politburo.63 Since Hu was ousted, 
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no subsequent Chinese leader has dared soften their attitudes toward Japan and pursue a policy 
of conciliation as marked as that of Hu.
64
 
In 1989, the third round of student protests, which culminated in the tragic Tiananmen 
Massacre that received worldwide attention, was also focused on the shortcomings of the 
Chinese government, particularly government corruption and the lack of democratic political 
reform. Although these protests were initiated by students, they soon spread to other segments of 
the population. Since this was the first major popular protest directed against the CCP, and not 
foreign imperialism, the Chinese government faced a domestic security crisis, a crisis of 
“nontraditional security of the party-state: the ideological security, regime security, and cultural 
security of the CCP.”65    
As a response to this domestic security crisis, China’s leaders decided that the focus of 
China’s youths must be redirected from domestic to foreign issues. Thus, they started to 
reemphasize China’s Century of Humiliation,66 which has served to legitimize the CCP as the 
only political party in China able to stand up to the foreign imperialists and the suffering that 
they inflicted on China.
67
 The teaching of modern Chinese history from a CCP-sanctioned 
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perspective was a major part of this patriotic education policy. However, this patriotic education 
policy went far beyond school textbooks; it also included a wide range of activities for patriotic 
education that would take place not only in schools, but also in museums (such as the Nanjing 
Massacre Memorial Hall), in literature and film, and in other forms of popular media such as 
newspapers and television.
68
 Chinese patriotic education has since focused noticeably more on 
the Japanese invasion of China, symbolically culminating in the horrors of the Nanjing Massacre, 
than on the crimes of any other imperialist power during the Century of Humiliation.
69
 
Deng believed that the events at Tiananmen in 1989 represented the failure of the CCP 
propaganda system to properly educate the Chinese people. He saw patriotism not as something 
natural, but rather as something that had to be inculcated in the minds of China’s youth.70 Efforts 
toward patriotic education were initiated soon after Tiananmen, with events such as the 1990 
publication of the first National Humiliation history textbook since 1937.
71
 The disintegration 
and collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 also worried China, providing another incentive to 
legitimize the CCP through patriotic education.
72
 However, the CCP’s Central Propaganda 
Department did not propose its final, official outline for the Patriotic Education Campaign until 
1994, under the leadership of Jiang Zemin.  
Unlike under Mao, when Sino-Japanese friendship was a major theme in political 
education, when the CCP Propaganda Department started its “patriotic education campaign,” a 
nationalist attachment to the Chinese state became the dominant theme in both schools and in the 
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media.
73
 In the 1990s, the “new authoritarianism” argument claimed that only the CCP was 
strong enough to hold China together. In particular, this was based on historical example: the 
CCP had liberated the suffering Chinese people from the oppression inflicted upon them by 
foreigners, particularly Japan, during the Century of Humiliation. As a plaque at the Nanjing 
Memorial Hall reads: “The government was in disorder and our nation was weak. How could we 
have been safe?”74  
 
Chapter II: The Historiography of the Nanjing Massacre and the 
Patriotic Education Campaign 
Why did the Patriotic Education Campaign end up disproportionately emphasizing 
Japanese military atrocities, as opposed to other historical grievances from Western imperialism 
during the Century of Humiliation? First, it is important to note that the original purpose of 
patriotic education was not to promote anti-Japanese sentiments. Its main goal was to legitimize 
the CCP through both celebrating the long-standing, glorious tradition of Chinese society
75
 and 
by portraying the CCP as the only political entity that was able to save China from victimization 
by foreign powers and end the Century of Humiliation. The Patriotic Education Campaign’s 
main purpose was to boost support for the CCP and its objectives of economic progress and 
strengthening the state.
76
 For example, in Chinese history textbooks, it has been taught that 
World War II ended because of the heroic efforts of the CCP in the War of Resistance against 
Japan.
77
 Since the Patriotic Education Campaign’s objective was to place the CCP in as positive 
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a light as possible, tragedies inflicted upon the Chinese people by the CCP itself, such as the 
Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the Tiananmen Massacre, were not 
mentioned.
78
    
Jiang Zemin and the CCP Propaganda Department formulated their “Outline of 
Implementing Patriotic Education” in August of 1994, stating that: “It is the sacred duty of the 
press and publishing, radio, film, and television departments of all levels to use advanced media 
technology to conduct patriotic education to the masses.”79 The atrocities committed in World 
War II by the Japanese military, particularly the Nanjing Massacre, were relatively fresh in the 
collective Chinese psyche and held much potential for invoking strong emotional reactions. The 
Japanese invasion of China in the early twentieth century inflicted more lasting damage on China 
than that of the other, earlier imperialistic advances by Western powers.
80
 Thus, it was natural for 
Japan to be the scapegoat for Chinese nationalism, alleviating pressure on the CCP and placing 
public scrutiny on Japan instead. In this way, the CCP was able to place the history of the 
Chinese people’s pain on Japan’s shoulders, salvaging its own reputation among its domestic 
audience:  
by placing the lion’s share of the blame for China’s past suffering, longstanding 
backwardness and current socioeconomic difficulties on Japan, the new narrative evaded 
many sensitive issues that might hurt national self-respect or the party’s prestige.
81
   
 
Invoking a strong emotional reaction from Chinese youth in particular was a way to 
ensure that the Patriotic Education Campaign would fulfill its objective of legitimizing the CCP. 
Inciting China’s “indignant youth” (fennuqingnian, 愤怒青年) to focus their energy toward 
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foreign issues, particularly those related to Japan, was a way to encourage them to contribute to 
developing their own country.
82
 The youth are one of the most prosperous sections of Chinese 
society, and their strong emotional reactions to Japan’s wartime legacy have helped created a 
strong sense of nationalism among them.
83
 
Reemphasizing the Nanjing Massacre in the public conscience in China first in the 80s, 
and most noticeably in Jiang’s campaign in the 90s, was a political move by the CCP. Prior to 
the 1980s, the PRC directed most of its antagonism toward its own people, those “class enemies,” 
according to Communist terminology, and “traitors to the Han race” (hanjian, 汉奸).84 However, 
after the 1980s, hostility was directed more toward the Japanese. Prior to the 1980s, the CCP had 
used the Nanjing Massacre to vilify Chiang and the KMT. However, after the 1980s, when the 
CCP’s regime had become more stable, the political rhetoric on a “unified China,” in which PRC 
was the only recognized government of both the mainland and Taiwan, became more 
pronounced. In political rhetoric, the CCP was no longer trying to vilify the KMT, the US, or the 
USSR; blame for the Nanjing Massacre fell squarely on the Japanese nation.
85
 This becomes 
more obvious when the portrayal of the Massacre in the Chinese public sphere in these decades 
is compared to what it was before the 1980s, when the Nanjing Massacre was not promulgated 
by the government as a symbol of Japanese aggression. Due to a changing political agenda in the 
1980s, the CCP began to emphasize patriotism through education.
86
 This trend sped up after the 
Tiananmen Massacre, and particularly after Jiang took office.  
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During the Second Sino-Japanese War itself, from 1937 to 1945, the Nanjing Massacre 
did not stand out as a salient symbol of Japanese aggression. Many atrocities were inflicted upon 
the Chinese people by the Japanese military, including mass killings, human experimentation and 
biological warfare (of which perhaps the most infamous example is Unit 731), the use of 
chemical weapons, bombings, forced labor, torture of POWs, rape, looting, and the comfort 
women.
87
 As Japanese Nanjing Massacre scholar Yoshida Takashi observes, “The international 
and domestic political realities of the time tended to divert attention elsewhere…The rape of 
Nanjing was not an isolated incident of Japanese violence, either in the eyes of most Chinese or 
in the opinion of the government.”88 The Nanjing Massacre was not extensively used as a 
government propaganda tool during this period, although those in Nanjing did maintain a strong 
interest in conducting research on the issue.
89
 During the war, the Nationalist government, which 
was then in power in China, had decided that relating Japan’s chemical warfare to the 
international community would produce more outrage against Japanese aggression than would 
relating an event such as Nanjing.
90
  
 After the end of World War II and the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945, the 
Chinese Nationalists and Communists resumed their civil war for control of the Chinese 
mainland. After Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists were ousted, neither the CCP on the 
mainland nor the Kuomintang on Taiwan utilized the Nanjing Massacre as a symbol of Japanese 
aggression. For them, it was more important to defeat their current enemies than to dwell on the 
past; for the PRC, the main enemy in the 1950s was the United States. The Japanese people were 
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not blamed for the war, but rather considered as victims of their military leaders.
91
 In China in 
the 1950s, the Nanjing Massacre was not considered as horrific as the atomic bombs in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The PRC was sympathetic toward the victims of the atomic bombs, as 
they, too, were greatly concerned about the American nuclear threat.
92
 How vastly different this 
approach is from the historiographical focus of Iris Chang in 1997, who claimed that by using 
Sun Zhaiwei’s calculation of 377,400 victims in Nanjing, the death toll in Nanjing was greater 
than that of Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined!
93
  
 During the Korean War, the Chinese government utilized the Nanjing Massacre, but not 
as a symbol of Japanese aggression. Seemingly counterintuitive from the lens of the twenty-first 
century, the Nanjing Massacre was a CCP propaganda tool against the United States and 
American imperialism during the Korean War. A 1952 article published by The New China 
Monthly (新华月报 Xinhua Yuebao) claimed that those Americans who had stayed behind in 
Nanjing to establish a Safety Zone for Chinese refugees not only chose to protect their property 
over Chinese lives, but had also assisted Japanese troops and sent Chinese troops off to be 
executed. The Xinhua Yuebao article also featured photographs from the Nanjing Massacre with 
the caption, “Remember the Nanjing Massacre, Stop American Remilitarization of Japan!”94 In 
another article the previous year, American missionaries such as the “goddess of Nanjing” 
Minnie Vautrin, who is currently viewed as a heroine in China for saving countless lives during 
the Massacre, were accused of being “imperialists and fascists.”95 
 In conjunction with propaganda against the United States, which was part of the larger 
anti-capitalist, anti-feudal political agenda at the time, the CCP also included propaganda against 
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the GMD. The United States supported the GMD during the Cold War, and the GMD threatening 
to take over the mainland. As such, the CCP used the Nanjing Massacre as a propaganda tool 
during the 1950s to discredit the GMD. CCP leaders directly blamed the GMD’s cowardice and 
incompetence for the horrible tragedy in Nanjing. Chiang Kai-shek and his commander, Tang 
Sheng-chi, who abandoned Nanjing right as the city was about to fall, were strongly vilified in 
the narrative of the Massacre.
96
 Chiang himself left the city on December 8
th
, and Tang 
abandoned the city on December 12
th
, right before it was about to fall, leaving behind him 
disorder among the officers, troops, and panic among the city residents.
97
 
 Due to pressing domestic issues, the desire to eschew a victim mentality, and strong 
incentives for preserving good relations with Japan,
98
 the Nanjing Massacre did not play a 
significant role in Chinese domestic politics until the 1980s. Along with the rise of patriotic 
education, the Nanjing Massacre reentered the Chinese national consciousness in the mid-1980s, 
and began to play a prominent role in government propaganda and popular media.
99
 As a truly 
horrific and tragic atrocity, the Nanjing Massacre has served well as a focal point for 
remembering the Century of Humiliation and foreign aggression, specifically against Japan, with 
whom the Chinese have had a love-hate relationship for centuries.
100
 Although there were other 
massacres in other cities during the Second Sino-Japanese War, none of them were equal in 
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intensity or scale to the Nanjing Massacre. In addition, whereas atrocities such as Unit 731 and 
the “comfort women” happened slowly over a longer period of time, the time frame of the 
Massacre was shorter and more intense, making it ideal for a symbol of Chinese suffering.
101
       
At the same time, though, it is important to realize that the maintenance of Sino-Japanese 
friendship was a key aspect in China’s Japan policy after the normalization of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries in 1972. However, it was difficult to balance this goal of 
friendship with patriotic education initiatives. As Yoshida notes, “in the post-Mao period, the 
teaching of war was linked with the political goal of promoting patriotism and loyalty to the 
party, a party now eager to encourage the creation of more literature and memorials regarding the 
Anti-Japanese War.”102 
In the 1980s and 90s, there was a great flourishing of popular media related to the 
Nanjing Massacre, commemorating its horrors and serving to symbolize Japanese aggression as 
part of the Century of Humiliation. In turn, this focus on an external scapegoat, Japan, through 
the narrative of the Nanjing Massacre served both to domestically legitimize the CCP and, 
particularly in the 90s, to take the focus off of domestic issues.
103
  
It is important to note that in the patriotic education initiatives, 20
th
 century modern 
Chinese history, as opposed to China’s long dynastic history, was the focus in both education 
and in popular media. Thus, although the Nanjing Massacre is known by nearly every Chinese, 
not as well known is the fact that Nanjing’s history is wrought with destruction and tragedy. As 
Michael Berry, a prominent China scholar and professor of contemporary Chinese cultural 
studies, notes, “perhaps more than any other Chinese capital, the city formerly known as Jinling 
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金陵 has been riddled by dynastic failure, violent political suppressions, natural disasters, and 
atrocity throughout its history.”104 
Nanjing has served as a capital city during ten distinct historical eras in China, starting 
from the Kingdom of Wu (222-280) and ending in the Republican era (1928-37). The first major 
destruction to the city was in 589, after the former Chen dynasty had fallen to the Sui dynasty. 
The first emperor of the Sui had all architectural and historical sites related to the Chen 
demolished, resulting in a comprehensive destruction of the city’s material culture.105 However, 
Nanjing has a long history not only of material destruction, but also of the destruction of human 
lives. Much more recently, the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) also left a bloody mark on the city 
of Nanjing. It was not so much the Taiping insurrection itself, which established Nanjing as the 
capital of the Kingdom of Heavenly Peace, that is remembered, but rather the brutal suppression 
of the Taipings by an army sent by the Qing dynastic court to crush the rebellion, which 
allegedly killed thousands.
106
  
In China, the noticeable increase in historical publications related to the Nanjing 
Massacre started around the mid-80s. The primary focus of these publications was to “prove” the 
brutality of the Nanjing Massacre and to provide evidence that the atrocities had, indeed, 
occurred to the extent the Chinese government claimed (their official figure is 300,000 
victims).
107
 Indeed, the theme of proof or testimony, jianzheng (见证), looms large in historical 
accounts of the Nanjing Massacre in China.
108
 This theme was not only limited to historical 
publications, such as documentary film, photos, wartime diaries, and witness testimonials, but 
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was also present in film and literature at the time.
 109
 For instance, in August 1983, an 85-page 
booklet titled Historical Sources: Materials on the Nanjing Massacre Committed by the 
Japanese Army of Invasion (史料选集侵华日军南京大屠杀史料专集) was published by the 
Research Committee on Historical Materials of the City of Nanjing. Although the booklet was 
only meant for a small audience of domestic viewers, the fact that it was even published 
represented a shift from the earlier CCP stance, when very little scholarship on the Massacre was 
permitted circulation in China.
110
  
 Many books on the Nanjing Massacre have been purposefully published on historically 
significant dates. For instance, as the fortieth anniversary of World War II on August 15, 1985 
approached, numerous scholarly books on the Nanjing Massacre, mostly concerned with the 
“proof” narrative, were published in China. These included: Historical Materials on the Nanjing 
Massacre Committed by the Japanese Army of Invasion (侵华日军南京大屠杀史料), which 
included a translation of Dr. Lewis S.C. Smythe’s book War Damage in the Nanking Area, 
survivor testimonials, eyewitness reports, and diaries from soldiers and civilians; and Japanese 
War Atrocities: The Nanjing Massacre (日军侵华暴行：南京大屠杀), published by Gao 
Xingzu, a professor at Nanjing University.
111
 In November of 1987, a month before the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, Archival Materials on the Nanjing Massacre Committed by 
the Japanese Army of Invasion (侵华日军南京大屠杀档案), which included a number of 
declassified documents from the Massacre, was published.
112
 These publications reflected the 
government-approved, politically correct view of the Massacre; the government kept a close 
watch over classified documents related to the Massacre that were preserved in the Number Two 
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China Historical Archives and the Nanjing City Archives. Due to government restrictions, 
certain themes loom large in documents on the Nanjing Massacre published during this time: 
Photographs must show Japanese brutality only; Japanese villains must not have human faces; 
it must be accepted that the Japanese military ferociously killed at least 300,000 innocent 
Chinese after the fall of Nanjing; and the literature must contribute to stirring patriotism and 
loyalty to the party among the people in China, including Taiwan.
113
  
 
Closely following the publication of the Archival Materials, the first reportage book on the 
Nanjing Massacre was published in China in December, 1987, for the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Massacre. The book, simply called The Nanjing Massacre, was written by Chinese journalist and 
reportage writer Xu Zhigeng; according to Xu, the book was an immediate success and sold 
150,000 copies in its first month on the market.
114
   
In addition to scholarly documents, there were also novels published on the Nanjing 
Massacre in the 1980s in mainland China. In reality, some of these fictional portrayals of the 
Massacre had been written much earlier. However, the chaotic political climate, Cold War 
politics, and the PRC’s struggle to modernize made fictional representations of the Massacre “a 
low priority of a political impossibility” until the 1980s.115 One of the first novels published, 
Zhou Erfu’s The Fall of Nanjing (南京的陷落), was made available to the public on the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre in 1987 as a “symbolic literary commemoration.”116 Along 
with many other CCP-endorsed works,
117
 Zhou (b. 1914), who had attended Mao’s famous 
Yan’an forum on literature and art in 1942, has written a six-volume opus concerning important 
people and events in the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Fall of the Nanjing was published in 
1987 as the opening novel in A Portrait of Ten Thousand Miles Along the Great Wall of 
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China.
118
 The series culminated with Chongqing in Mist, published in 1995 to commemorate the 
50
th
 anniversary of the end of World War II. However, although Zhou had envisioned a novel 
about the Nanjing Massacre during the War of Resistance, he did not have a finished draft until 
1982.
119
 This earlier novel is different from later novels about the Nanjing Massacre because of 
its lack of focus on the atrocities committed by the Japanese military: the novel ends right before 
the atrocities begin, with the Japanese breaching the city wall.
120
    
 Like Zhou, Ah Long (a pen name for writer Chen Shoumei) was also in Yan’an while it 
served as a communist base (1939), although he had to leave for Xi’an soon after for medical 
treatment. While he was recovering, he devoted two months of his time to writing his novel on 
the Nanjing Massacre, simply entitled Nanjing. He completed the novel in October 1939, making 
it the earliest Chinese literary work to attempt to expose the Japanese military atrocities in 
Nanjing.
121
 However, Nanjing was not published until 1987, twenty years after Ah Long’s death, 
coinciding with the fiftieth anniversary of the July 7 Incident (七七事变) in August of 1987,122 
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which is also an important historical date in the Chinese conscience.
123
 Like Zhou’s novel, Ah 
Long’s Nanjing focuses mainly on the events that preceded the Massacre, although Nanjing’s 
narrative did focus more on the lives of ordinary Chinese individuals.
124
 However, despite the 
fact that the Japanese military atrocities are not described in the novel itself, for its publication in 
1987, the novel’s name was changed from Nanjing to Nanjing Bloody Sacrifice (Nanjing xueji 
南京血祭). This reflected the CCP’s shift toward patriotic education and increased emphasis on 
the Century of Humiliation, in which the Nanjing Massacre served as an important component of 
national rhetoric.  
 Works on the Nanjing Massacre in the 1980s were not merely limited to writing, but also 
included the production of films concerning the Massacre (both documentaries and fictional 
narratives). In 1987, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Massacre, PRC director Luo 
Guanqun’s film Massacre in Nanjing was released. Similar to the literary works published on the 
Massacre in the 1980s, Massacre in Nanjing focuses on the burden of proof. The main plot of the 
film centers on a doctor’s attempts to recover photos of Japanese atrocities in Nanjing in order to 
prove that the Massacre did, in fact, occur. Even the title of the film in Chinese, which literally 
translates to English as “Bloody Evidence in the Massacred City (屠城血证),”125 points toward 
this burden of proof. In the opening credits, black-and-white documentary footage from the War 
of Japanese Resistance is created, highlighting the ‘authenticity’ of the film’s narrative. Adding 
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to this effect, the opening credits end with the title “December 13, 1937,” followed immediately 
by the number “300,000,” the official CCP-approved number of victims.126   
  As mentioned in the introduction, historiography is not limited to scholarly works, or 
even to literature and film, but also includes educational resources, such as textbooks, and even 
commemorative historical sites. In mainland China, these types of historical sites reflect the 
official view of the PRC, who is in charge of their construction and how they are subsequently 
used.
127
 Thus, as was the case with the literature and film on the Massacre during the 1980s, the 
construction of the state-sponsored Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall reflected the CCP’s 
increased emphasis on patriotic education through historical commemoration. The Memorial 
Hall was opened in Nanjing on August 15, 1985, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of 
World War II.  As with the literature and film on the Massacre, the opening date of the memorial 
was intentionally chosen to trigger the greatest impact among the public. The Memorial Hall 
places a heavy emphasis on the burden of proof: on the façade of the Memorial Hall, inscribed 
on a stone wall, the words “Victims 300,000” loom large. This represents the key role the high 
death toll plays in the politically correct narrative of the Massacre in post-1980s China.
128
   
The Memorial Hall is a testament to the success of the Chinese Communist Party, as 
opposed to the Nationalists or, for that matter, any other group, in bringing China out of its 
Century of Humiliation into an era of national strength and economic prosperity. Thus, the 
Memorial Hall has become a part of the CCP’s historical narrative, placing the Massacre within a 
larger framework of revolutionary development in China. This theme is even seen within the 
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displays in the Memorial Hall itself – at the Memorial’s exit, for instance, is a treatise on 
building up China through revolutionary reform.
129
 
 While the CCP started to noticeably prioritize patriotic education and the role of the 
Nanjing Massacre therein during the 1980s, this trend crescendoed in the 1990s after Jiang 
Zemin and the CCP Propaganda Department implemented the official Patriotic Education 
Campaign, which became the dominant political discourse both in the classroom and in the 
popular sphere.
130
 As a result, the government’s emphasis on patriotic education had a direct 
impact on how the Chinese public, particularly China’s youth, perceived Japanese wartime 
atrocities.
131
 This can be seen in educational discourse in the 90s, in commemorative events 
across the nation (particularly in 1995), in films and literature, and even in the expansion of the 
Nanjing Massacre Memorial Museum in the 90s.  
 The Nanjing Massacre Memorial’s architect, Qi Kang, describes the first phase of 
construction of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial, which was finished in 1985, as focused on the 
themes of “disaster, indignant grief, and depression.”132 In contrast, the second phase of the 
Memorial, which was completed in 1995 for the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, 
focuses more on the themes of “pain” and “hatred”133 than it does on grief. While the focal point 
of Phase One is mourning and commemoration of the victims, Phase Two is more active, 
“focusing on China’s unfinished historical business with Japan.”134 Phase Two transitions the 
memorial from past to present, dynamically shifting the Nanjing Massacre from merely a 
historical tragedy to a current struggle for remembrance, as well as a part of the current CCP 
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regime’s political agenda in promoting nationalism in China’s youth through patriotic education. 
For instance, since 1996, it has become mandatory for Chinese schoolchildren to visit the 
Memorial.
135
  
 Education in China shifted noticeably toward nationalism in the 90s. A year before Jiang 
and the CCP Propaganda Department had officially initiated the Patriotic Education Campaign, 
on April 28 and 29, 1993, sixteen delegates from different party organizations attended a forum 
on patriotic education held by the Propaganda Department. Patriotic education was not limited to 
school textbooks, although textbooks and the school curriculum as a whole have certainly been a 
vital component of the Patriotic Education Campaign. On the contrary, suggestions from the 
forum for “effective means of patriotic education” included:  
the use of mass media such as newspapers, film, and television and radio programs; the 
establishment of museums and memorial halls; the popularization of patriotic art and 
literature; and the creation of systematic outlines for the patriotic education in kindergartens, 
elementary and secondary schools, and colleges and universities.
136
 
 
Just as the historiography of the Nanjing Massacre is expressed in multiple forms, so are the 
patriotic education initiatives. Since the government controls a politically correct version of the 
Nanjing Massacre as part of the patriotic education initiative in China, we see that there is almost 
a complete overlap between contemporary narratives of the Nanjing Massacre available in 
mainland China today and the Patriotic Education Campaign. 
 Since 1990 marked the 150
th
 anniversary of the end of the Second Opium War (1856-
1860), the Chinese State Education Commission determined that this would be an opportunity to 
introduce a more in-depth patriotic education program in schools for all ages. Indeed, as part of a 
book series on “history, patriotism, and socialism,” the first National Humiliation history 
textbook since 1937 was published in mainland China in April 1990 on the evening of the 150
th
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anniversary of the Opium War.
137
 This textbook and others like it served two major purposes: 
one, to promote the version of history that proved the CCP’s legitimacy to Chinese youth; and 
two, to draw attention away from the recent Tiananmen movement.
138
 The State Education 
Commission announced on June 1, 1991, that more classroom time would be spent learning 
about Chinese modern history.
139
 Modern history began with the first Opium War and continued 
through the Century of Humiliation to the present, when the CCP was able to free the Chinese 
people from the yoke of imperialism and lead them into a new era of national strength and 
prosperity.     
Films and novels about the Massacre, both from the Chinese mainland and from the 
international community, were abundant in the 1990s. The year 1995 is especially significant for 
popular media concerning the Nanjing Massacre, as it was the 50
th
 anniversary of the end of 
World War II. This anniversary, where Japanese military aggression was the central focus, 
played an important role in the Patriotic Education Campaign. In August of 1995, there were 
celebrations across China commemorating the Chinese victory over Japan. Jiang Zemin himself, 
along with his colleagues, attended no less than seventeen official celebrations of this victory.
140
 
In 1995, two films – Black Sun: The Nanjing Massacre and Don’t Cry, Nanking – were 
both released in China to correspond with the 50
th
 anniversary of the end of World War II. 
Immediately, then, the films cannot be separated from mainland politics at this time, as they were 
released as part of a greater narrative of historical commemoration.
141
 However, the two films 
were exceedingly different in their portrayal of the Nanjing Massacre. Black Sun, directed by 
Hong Kong filmmaker T.F. Mou, is largely impersonal – most of the Chinese characters’ names, 
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for instance, are not even provided for the audience. Interestingly, ten out of the eleven named 
characters are, in fact, Japanese. Berry speculates that the director’s strategy in doing this was to 
emphasize the accountability of the victimizers. However, the end result is a silencing of the 
victims’ voices.142    
Because of its graphic violence in its portrayal of the atrocities in Nanjing, Black Sun was 
the first-ever film to receive a Category III rating in Hong Kong, which corresponds to a rating 
of NC-17.
143
 Although produced with the intention of becoming a part of the politics of 
commemoration in mainland China, Black Sun was banned in China by the PRC censors. It was 
probably banned because of its overly violent content and fears that, if widely viewed in China, it 
would strain Sino-Japanese relations.
144
 Again, it is important to remember that the goal of the 
Patriotic Education Campaign was not to strain Sino-Japanese relations, but merely to strengthen 
patriotic nationalism and loyalty to the party. Although anti-Japanese public sentiments, 
particularly among the Chinese youth, increased noticeably in the 1990s, this was not an 
intentional move by the CCP. Rather, it was an unfortunate miscalculation of the effects 
domestic politics could have on foreign relations, as I discuss below.  
While Black Sun was banned in mainland China, Wu Ziniu’s film Don’t Cry, Nanking 
was widely viewed both in China and internationally. Out of the three influential films 
concerning the Nanjing Massacre directed by Chinese filmmakers during the late-80s to mid-90s 
– Massacre in Nanjing, Black Sun, and Don’t Cry, Nanking – it was the latter that was viewed 
the most.
145
 Don’t Cry, Nanking was actually funded by Taiwan, both making it the most 
expensive Nanjing Massacre film by 1995 and showing that the Nanjing Massacre has 
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increasingly become a historical issue over which the governments of the PRC and of Taiwan 
can find common ground. The cast and crew of the film included stars from Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
mainland China, and even Japan, facilitating a more creative and in-depth view on the Nanjing 
Massacre and a wider audience for Don’t Cry, Nanking, than for Massacre in Nanjing or for 
Black Sun. 
Although Wu’s film does not reach the gory level of Black Sun, it is also a quite violent 
portrayal of the Massacre. However, unlike Black Sun, Don’t Cry, Nanking focuses much more 
on character development than Black Sun. The two main characters are a Chinese doctor, Chen 
Xian, who has married a Japanese woman named Rieko. They, along with their children, form 
the central narrative of the film, which shows their struggle to stay together amidst the horrors of 
the Nanjing Massacre. The Japanese wife, Rieko, is presented in the film as innocent and 
completely separate from the guilty Japanese soldiers who victimize the residents of Nanjing. 
The result is that Don’t Cry, Nanking presents a more humanistic view of the Japanese, avoiding 
the tendency of popular media in China to demonize the Japanese and serving as a more general 
denouncement on the brutality of war and depraved human nature as a whole, which makes any 
human being, whether from China, Japan, or elsewhere, capable of such horrors.
146
  
Like in Luo Guanqun’s Massacre in Nanjing, both Black Sun and Don’t Cry, Nanking are 
concerned with the burden of proof that continues to dominate the politically correct portrayals 
of the Nanjing Massacre in mainland China. All three of the films end with subtitles of the 
300,000 death toll, working to authenticate this number into the collective memory of the 
viewers, even at a time when this number, outside of the PRC’s official rhetoric, is still debated 
by the international community of Nanjing Massacre scholars.
147
 Furthermore, through violent 
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portrayals of the Massacre (although Black Sun is clearly in a category of its own regarding the 
gory, NC-17 depictions of the atrocities), all three films are concerned with authenticating the 
historical reality of the Massacre.
148
 This emphasis on proof is not to convince the Chinese 
public that the Nanjing Massacre actually occurred – they are in little need of such proof. Rather, 
“proving” the Nanjing Massacre through such popular media identifies a particular audience as 
Chinese and, at the same time, alludes to the other, the Japanese audience.
149
 At the same time, 
this type of “proof” generates strong emotions of indignant anger, outrage and nationalistic pride 
among Chinese viewers, which has been the main goal of the Patriotic Education Campaign.  
There were also several literary publications on the Nanjing Massacre in this period. In 
1995, Xu Zhigeng, who was an experienced author of “party-sponsored reportage literature,”150 
released his book Lest We Forget: Nanjing Massacre, 1937. Lest We Forget tells the story of the 
Massacre in photographs, continuing the trend of emphasizing visual proof of the Massacre in 
popular media. Around this same time, Sun Zhaiwei, whose quote on Nanjing is mentioned in 
the introduction of this paper, published his Nanjing Elegy: Records of Atrocities Committed by 
the Japanese Army. Sun himself recommended that this book “be used for educational and 
research purposes.”151 However, both Sun and Xu’s books, though claiming to be historically 
accurate, do not contain bibliographies, footnotes, or references to back up these claims. 
Although both of these books claim to be examples of accurate historical research, due to their 
literary embellishments and lack of citations, they also tend toward the genre of historical 
fiction.
152
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In the following year, 1996, contemporary author Ye Zhaoyan published his novel 
Nanjing 1937: A Love Story (1937的爱情, 1937 de aiqing) in mainland China. Similar to Ah 
Long’s Nanjing, the plot in Ye Zhaoyang’s Nanjing 1937 also takes place in the months 
preceding the Massacre, rather than focusing on the Massacre itself. The focus of the story is on 
the splendor and the material and economic prosperity of the city of Nanjing just before the 
Massacre. Curiously, it is written in the style of Mandarin Duck and Butterfly literature, which is 
traditionally considered an apolitical genre.
153
 Through this, Ye Zhaoyan’s novel focuses on two 
different levels of nostalgia – nostalgia for the literary traditions of the Republican Era and 
nostalgia for the long-forgotten glory of the past grandeur of the city of Nanjing.
154
 The fact that 
the Massacre is not figured in the plot makes its presence that much more powerful – the reader, 
who knows more than the characters trapped inside of the book’s historical chronology, is fully 
aware of the tragedy that is about to unfold, making the former grandeur of Nanjing that much 
more poignant to behold.   
In the 1990s, as the Nanjing Massacre came to play a greater role in social media in 
China through Jiang’s Patriotic Education Campaign, it also began to enter into the international 
social conscience, particularly in the West. In 1995, two authors based in the United States, R.C. 
Binstock and Paul West, both published novels based on the Nanjing Massacre. Although 
Binstock’s The Tree of Heaven takes place in the aftermath of the Massacre, the memories of the 
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Massacre itself continue to haunt the protagonists and guide the central plot.
155
 Similar to Wu 
Ziniu’s Don’t Cry, Nanking, which was released during the same year, The Tree of Heaven also 
features a cross-national romance, this time between a Japanese man and a Chinese woman. In 
Paul West’s The Tent of Orange Mist, the protagonist is a sixteen-year old Chinese girl, who 
becomes the favorite of a Japanese official and is forced to prostitute herself to survive. Like in 
The Tree of Heaven, West’s novel also portrays Sino-Japanese romance, albeit in very different 
form.
156
   
Two years later, to commemorate the 60
th
 anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, Chinese-
American journalist Iris Chang published her influential Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten 
Holocaust of World War II. After the book’s initial publication in 1997, it quickly rose to the 
New York Times bestseller list, where it remained for over two months, and received popular 
critical acclaim, favorable reviews, and little public criticism among US audiences.
157
 The 
American public quickly accepted Chang’s book as an authoritative source on the Massacre. Due 
to Cold War politics, the American government had pursued Japan as an ally to counter the 
USSR and China. For the US, this led to a more hands-off approach to historical issues, due to 
the fact that the US did not want to embarrass Japanese leaders who had been involved in World 
War II and were now in power under the US occupation.
158
 Largely due to the influence of John 
Hersey’s report on Hiroshima, the American public’s perception of Japan had largely been as 
victims, not as victimizers.
159
 Through Chang’s efforts, many Americans learned about the 
Nanjing Massacre for the first time. 
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In the beginning of the 21
st
 century, Chang’s The Rape of Nanking triggered an 
outpouring of Nanjing Massacre scholarship, particularly in the United States, but also in the 
international community.
 160
 Much of this scholarship was in reaction to the black-and-white, 
emotionally-based portrayal of the Japanese in her narrative.
161
 Not only does Chang present the 
“Rape of Nanking” as a historical atrocity, she portrays it as an injustice that continues into the 
present. What she dubs the “second Rape of Nanking” is the attempt by “the Japanese” today to 
cover up the Nanjing Massacre as if it had never happened. As Chang claims: 
Whatever the course of postwar history, the Rape of Nanking will stand as a blemish upon the 
honor of human beings. But what makes the blemish particularly repugnant is that history has 
never written a proper end for the story. Sixty years later the Japanese as a nation are still 
trying to bury the victims of Nanking – not under the soil, as in 1937, but into historical 
oblivion…The book started out as an attempt to rescue those victims from more degradation 
by Japanese revisionists and to provide my own epitaph for the hundreds upon thousands of 
unmarked graves in Nanking.
162
  
  
This claim is patently false, and fails to sufficiently recognize the wide range of voices that exist 
in contemporary Japan. Through Chang’s monolithic portrayals of “the Japanese” and “the 
Japanese psyche,” she unintentionally equates “the Japanese” with “the Japanese revisionists,” 
the far right-wing in Japan that seeks to tone down the Nanjing Massacre Japan’s war crimes. 
The most extreme right-wing members claim that the Massacre never happened. However, this 
extreme group comprises a small minority in Japan, and through lumping the Japanese into a 
homogenous group of revisionists, Chang does a disservice to the many serious Japanese 
scholars such as Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Awaya Kentarō, Kasahara Tokushi, and Honda Katsuichi, 
who have labored long to increase both Japanese and international awareness of the Massacre.
163
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 As a journalist by training, not a historian, Chang’s knowledge of history, particularly of 
Japanese history, is shaky at best. She paints a simplistic portrayal of the Japanese military 
occupation of Nanjing, using flawed sources such as David Bergamini’s Japan’s Imperial 
Conspiracy, in which there is no room for “good” Japanese or “bad” Chinese. However, some of 
Chang’s historical research is fairly accurate, such as her description of the Japanese invasion of 
Nanjing. In addition, her work has both increased the knowledge of the Nanjing Massacre among 
the American public and furthered international Nanjing Massacre scholarship.     
Chang furthered international scholarship mainly through her discovery of primary 
source documents. Arguably her most important contribution was the discovery of the Diary of 
John Rabe.
164
 Not only has Chang’s scholarship contributed to Nanjing Massacre scholarship in 
the United States and in the international community, but also in mainland China. When she 
traveled to Nanjing to do fieldwork and interview survivors, Chang was able to make 
photocopies of primary source documents from US archives to give to scholars in Nanjing. This 
included the diary of Minnie Vautrin,
165
 with countless photographs, and over a thousand pages 
of information concerning the Tokyo Trials, none of which had ever been seen before by Chinese 
scholars.
166
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 Minnie Vautrin was an American missionary who, along with John Rabe and other foreigners, saved thousands 
of lives by sheltering Chinese refugees in the Nanjing Safety Zone. 
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The reception of Chang’s book in mainland China was very positive. From enthusiastic 
accounts on Chang written in mainland China, we can see that Chang’s view of the Massacre has 
been fully endorsed by the CCP and by individual journalists and scholars.
167
 This can be further 
evidenced by the bronze statue of Iris Chang that was erected posthumously
168
 at the Nanjing 
Massacre Memorial Hall in 2005. Although this was unlikely Chang’s original intention in 
writing the book, The Rape of Nanking has become a powerful tool in further promoting the 
CCP’s official view of the Nanjing Massacre in mainland China. The book both provides a 
heavily symbolic interpretation of the Massacre in relation to Japanese military atrocities and 
connects the Massacre to Japanese war guilt in contemporary politics. Chang emphasizes the 
inhumanity of the atrocities in great detail, provoking a sense of outrage among those who read 
her book.  
It has been the Chinese American community that has publicized the Massacre in the 
United States to inform the American public of what happened in Nanjing. In 1987, the year of 
the 50
th
 anniversary of the Massacre, the Chinese Alliance for Memorial and Justice was founded, 
and held a public event to commemorate the Massacre’s victims. Up until the present, they have 
publically commemorated the Massacre every year on December 13
th
.  
The overseas Chinese community as a whole has shown strong anti-Japanese sentiments. 
It was the US- based group ‘Alliance for Preserving the Truth of the Sino-Japanese War,’ for 
instance, that initiated the recent 2005 global signature campaign in opposition to Japan’s efforts 
to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
169
 Chinese Americans began 
publicizing the Massacre around the same time the Massacre and patriotic education began to be 
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emphasized more in mainland China.
170
 Indeed, it has been the Chinese diaspora that has been 
largely responsible for spreading awareness of the Massacre on an international level.
171
 Iris 
Chang is representative of the voice of the Chinese diaspora. The success of her book was 
largely due to the help of the overseas Chinese community: it was a group of Chinese Canadians 
from Toronto that arranged Chang’s book tour, and she also received assistance from Chinese-
American activists and the ALPHA (the Association for Learning and Preserving the History of 
World War II in Asia) group in her book promotion.
172
   
In this way, international relations between nations – in this case, mainly the US, China, 
and Japan – are influenced by popular media, which is influenced by and in turn influences 
public views of ‘the other.’ As is seen in the case of Jiang Zemin, these public sentiments have 
both crucial implications for domestic policies and unexpected repercussions in diplomatic 
relations on the international level.   
 
Chapter III: Sino-Japanese Relations in the 1990s 
 Jiang Zemin’s Patriotic Education Campaign was an important influencing factor in the 
deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1990s. Although it cannot be isolated from other 
events at the time, such as the territorial disputes over the Diaoyu Islands or China’s continued 
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nuclear testing from 1993 to 1996, neither can it be ignored. The Patriotic Education Campaign 
directly influenced Chinese public opinion on Japan, particularly through its symbolic use of the 
Nanjing Massacre. Thus, the historical issue of the Massacre was directly connected to 
contemporary Sino-Japanese politics, and had a direct bearing on the lens through which the 
Chinese public perceived events involving the Japanese. In China, Japan’s identity in the 1990s 
was tied back to its militaristic past. However, the Japanese people were not blind to the anti-
Japanese backlash in mainland China. They were aware of what was going on; subsequently, this 
led to an anti-Chinese backlash in Japan, and a dangerous vicious cycle was started.
173
  
 After the tragedy of Tiananmen in 1989, Japan was actually one of the first countries to 
resume Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Beijing; Tokyo’s third yen loan package to 
China was announced in 1990.
174
 Japan chose a different response to Tiananmen than the West 
had. Although Japan also signed the July 1989 G-7 statement condemning what had happened,
175
 
it was reluctant to isolate China for fear of what a chaotic China would do to the region.
176
 In 
addition, as Japanese Prime Minister Uno Sosuke stated, in view of Japan’s own historical 
grievances from World War II, the Japanese government was reluctant to condemn the Chinese 
government’s actions in Tiananmen.177  
 In 1991, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu was the first political leader from a developed 
country to visit China since Tiananmen. Japan seemed ready to restore positive diplomatic 
relations with China. However, although Japan was diplomatically softer in its response than the 
West, the Japanese public attitude toward China underwent a great change. Tiananmen shocked 
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the Japanese public into the awareness that China was still an authoritarian state that had the 
potential of brutally suppressing those who opposed it.
178
 According to a Japanese government 
survey taken in 1989, the percentage of Japanese who felt close with China decreased from 68.5 
percent in October 1988 to 51.6 percent in October 1989.
179
  
 Although Japanese public sentiments were already starting to shift away from China after 
Tiananmen, the Japanese government still adopted a practical stance toward relations with China 
in the early 1990s. If the Chinese state collapsed, this would have major negative implications 
for Japan both politically and economically.
180
 Japan worried that if China collapsed, this might 
send a massive wave of Chinese refugees to Japan. Realizing as well that China was becoming a 
major economic power, the Japanese government did not want to jeopardize this valuable 
relationship with China.  
 At the beginning of the 1990s, the Chinese government also tended toward positive 
diplomatic relations with Japan. Naturally, Beijing reacted with gratitude to Japan’s support of 
the Chinese regime post-Tiananmen. Both Deng and Jiang spoke highly of Japan; Deng referred 
to Sino-Japanese friendship as “precious,” and Jiang commended “Japan’s positive role in 
building peace and prosperity in Asia as well as the whole world.”181 In response to Beijing’s 
request, the Japanese Emperor made a historic visit to China in 1992. Both the Chinese and 
Japanese governments had great hope for Sino-Japanese relations after this visit – Beijing saw 
the Emperor’s visit as an excellent chance to promote economic ties between the two nations, 
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and Tokyo saw it as a chance to put historical issues behind them and usher in a new age of Sino-
Japanese friendship.
182
   
 Although the Emperor’s visit was a definite plus for Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, 
public sentiments at the time in China tell a much different story. Largely influenced by the push 
toward patriotic education that had started in China during the 1980s, a questionnaire was 
circulated among Beijing graduate students. According to the results of the questionnaire, many 
participants were in support of demanding an apology from the emperor for Japan’s war crimes. 
Many government officials were also supportive of this questionnaire, but the central Chinese 
government suppressed this protest movement before it could spread.
183
 Although the Chinese 
government was behind the patriotic education efforts, it did not wish to antagonize Japan. 
However, the responses of the youth to patriotic education had begun to grow stronger. A 
separate event in 1992 also provoked public alarm in China: the Japanese Diet passed legislation 
that permitted the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations. 
Since this could be interpreted as moving in the direction of abolishing Article IX
184
, the Chinese 
state media responded with great alarm.
185
 The years 1992 and 1993 also saw anti-Japanese 
public protests in China, where civilians demanded that Japan pay war preparations from the 
Second Sino-Japanese War.
186
   
 As the visit of the Japanese Emperor in 1992 shows, relations between two nations 
cannot be limited merely to formal, diplomatic relations. Public sentiments play an important 
role in foreign policy. In Sino-Japanese relations,  
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Societal anger and resentment constrain the two governments’ abilities to broaden 
cooperation. Emotion may serve an instrumental purpose as well. They add urgency and 
seriousness to an issue on the table. Emotions may either help to resolve the issue in favor of 
the initiator or may have a backlash effect. Emotions have thus evolved to serve foreign 
policy objectives.
187
  
 
As such, when considering Sino-Japanese relations in the 1990s, it is imperative to consider 
public opinion as well as formal diplomatic processes. Even in the early 1990s, when diplomatic 
relations seemed to be running smoothly between China and Japan, there was already malcontent 
brewing under the surface. I have already mentioned that in Japan, public sentiments were 
shifting away from China largely due to the Tiananmen Crisis. In China, public sentiments were 
also shifting away from Japan, but for very different reasons. 
 After the Tiananmen Massacre, domestic efforts in China to promote patriotic education 
increased. The break-up of the Soviet Union only added to this trend – after Tiananmen, China 
was afraid of a break-up similar to what the USSR had suffered.
188
 However, at the same time 
that the CCP domestically promoted patriotic education to legitimize the regime, internationally, 
it pursued positive diplomatic relations with Japan. One reason was clearly economic – between 
1986 and 1992, for instance, Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in China increased 
sevenfold. Despite all of the political issues that came to the forefront of diplomatic relations in 
the 1990s, the economic ties between the two countries served to stabilize relations. China was 
interested in Japan’s technology and investment, while Japan was interested in commercial 
opportunities in China whereby it could exert influence on China’s stability and development as 
a whole.
189
 During the 1990s, as Japan suffered from stagnation after the bursting of its 
economic bubble, China’s economy experienced rapid growth.190 Japan’s initial rise to power 
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after the Meiji Restoration had corresponded with China’s decline as the Qing Dynasty crumbled. 
More than a century later, for one of the first times in history, Japan and China were both strong 
nation states at the same time; diplomatic tension was, perhaps, inevitable.   
The 1994 Patriotic Education Campaign intensified the already-existing shift in 
government policy toward nationalism. The Nanjing Massacre, which had only been used as a 
symbol of Japanese aggression in mainland China since the 1980s, grew in symbolic importance 
after Jiang’s campaign began. Indeed, the Nanjing Massacre Museum’s construction and 
expansions – in 1985, 1995, and later in 2005 – perfectly coincide with the greatest periods of 
anti-Japanese protests (the 40
th
, 50
th
, and 60
th
 anniversaries of the end of World War II). In this 
way, as China scholar Susan Shirk aptly notes, “it became a focal point of Chinese popular 
nationalism and a counterpoint to Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine.”191 In 1996, a poll of Chinese youth 
by the China Youth Daily found that among 83.9 percent of participants, the word “Japan” “most 
easily” made them think of the Nanjing Massacre. For 81.3 percent of participants, the word 
“Japan” also conjured up thoughts of “Japanese denial” and “the war of resistance against 
Japanese aggression. In addition, when asked to choose an adjective to describe the Japanese, 
56.1 percent chose “cruel.”192 As these statistics show, the Patriotic Education Campaign had 
been all too successful in its efforts to promote nationalism through commemoration of the 
Century of Humiliation, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Nanjing Massacre.   
Examining the role of the Nanjing Massacre in popular media and as part of the Patriotic 
Education Campaign, as was done in Chapter II, is crucial because it acts as a gauge for 
understanding both the Chinese politics of identity, which is very tied up with the Century of 
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Humiliation, and Sino-Japanese relations as they continue into the twenty-first century.
193
 
Starting in the 1980s and increasing in the 1990s with the Patriotic Education Campaign, the 
Nanjing Massacre has played an important role in recounting China’s Century of Humiliation 
and the Second Sino-Japanese War. Although descriptions of the Massacre are, for the most part, 
short, they are a powerful part of the overall narrative of the Second Sino-Japanese War, which 
ends with China’s victory over Japan:  
The Nanjing massacre takes on particular symbolic weight because of its pivotal placement in 
Chinese history and historiography. In terms of physical and spiritual trauma, the Nanjing 
massacre is both the worst atrocity for China in World War II, and the worst atrocity in the 
Century of National Humiliation as a whole. The physical trauma of these rapes and murders 
takes on symbolic significance: the Nanjing Massacre represents the lowest point in modern 
Chinese history…Within the war itself, the Nanjing massacre is framed as a turning point 
whose barbaric atrocities ‘aroused the spirit of the Chinese race.’
194
  
 
From the 1990s onward, a major development in these portrayals of the Massacre has 
been its prominence on internet sites. This has been a particularly dangerous medium because in 
cyberspace, it is easy to detach images from their original contexts. Thus, meanings are easily 
distorted, particularly with graphic pictures, which are often accompanied by minimal text.
195
  
 In 1991, changes were made in junior high school history textbooks to reflect the new 
push toward patriotic education. In particular, the new textbooks contained a greater emphasis on 
the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Nanjing Massacre. Textbook accounts of the Nanjing 
Massacre used strong and graphic language. These accounts also connected the past Massacre 
with the present Japanese responsibility to atone for their past. For example, a passage on the 
Massacre from one textbook published during this time read: “Corpses and bones were scattered, 
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rubble piled up into hills, a prosperous historical city suddenly became a hell on earth. The debt 
of blood caused by the Japanese aggressors will never be forgotten by the Chinese people.”196  
By the mid-90s, Jiang’s Patriotic Education Campaign had fueled strong anti-Japanese 
sentiments among the youth. From the early 90s on, polls show that Chinese youth are more 
nationalistic than any other age group in China.
197
 However, they are also more obsessed with 
the Japan issue than either their parents’ or grandparents’ generations.198 Again, this was not the 
original intention of the Patriotic Education Campaign; it was a move intended to promote 
Chinese nationalism among the youth, to draw attention away from domestic issues In this 
regard, the Patriotic Education Campaign has been extremely successful; China’s young people 
are quite loyal to the state. Influential China scholars such as Suisheng Zhao and Zheng Wang 
agree that official state propaganda has been directly responsible for the nationalistic sentiments 
among the Chinese public in the mid-1990s.
199
 To put it plainly, the CCP had dug itself into a 
hole. By creating very successful nationalistic propaganda through popular media and through 
schools, the government was successful in promoting patriotism among the youth. The 
propaganda, through targeting China’s tragic past and the atrocities of the Japanese in Nanjing, 
was successful at legitimizing the current CCP regime. However, this success came at an 
unforeseen cost to China’s diplomatic relations with Japan: “official propaganda implicated the 
CCP’s legitimacy in a nationalist discourse from which it would find it difficult to extricate itself 
when public emotions swelled beyond the government’s pragmatic state-strengthening 
objectives.”200   
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The years 1995 to 1996 are considered to be the lowest point in Sino-Japanese relations 
since diplomatic relations had been normalized between the two nations in 1972. Granted, the 
Patriotic Education Campaign is not the only reason for this, but it is a prominent factor. In 1995, 
there were massive celebrations across China to commemorate the 50
th
 anniversary of the end of 
World War II. The year 1995 was considered to be the peak of the Patriotic Education campaign, 
with a great volume of propaganda produced to cover Japanese war crimes.
201
 In schools, there 
were required educational activities to commemorate the end of the War of Japanese Resistance. 
In August, homage was paid to veterans across the country. Troops came to schools to teach 
lessons on patriotism; their central theme was “The CCP was the mainstay of the force that led 
the Anti-Japanese War.”202  
In 1995, Japanese public opinions of China also took a sharp turn for the worse. Even in 
October 1994, a Japanese Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy showed that those Japanese who 
felt a ‘sense of affinity toward China,’ 51.3 percent, still outnumbered those that did not, 44.3 
percent.
203
 However, by the following year, 1995, relations had started to deteriorate.  There are 
three major incidents from this year that concretely mark the deterioration of Sino-Japanese 
relations during this year: not only did the commemorations of the end of World War II strike a 
dissonant chord among the Japanese, but China’s continued nuclear testing and the reemergence 
of the sensitive Taiwan issue also strained bilateral relations.
204
  
China’s continued nuclear testing from October 1993 to July 1996 had left a very bad 
taste in the mouths of the Japanese. Not only did the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conduct 
nuclear weapon tests, but it continued to conduct them a few days after China’s participation in 
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the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which China, along with the four other nuclear powers, 
committed itself to cut back on nuclear tests in 1995.
205
 Since the memories of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki are still fairly recent, and Japan remains the only country to have been victimized by 
atomic bombings, the country is hypersensitive to issues concerning nuclear activity. Thus, the 
act of continued nuclear testing in the face of international disapproval caused Sino-Japanese 
relations to deteriorate. After China’s nuclear test in May 1995, Japan felt it necessary to cut off 
humanitarian aid, which had come in the form of Official Development Assistance (ODA), to 
Beijing. Beijing reacted angrily to the cutting off of ODA, citing historic grievances and 
claiming that the aid was a form of war reparation and thus must continue.
206
  
This triggered a vicious cycle in which anti-Japanese sentiments in China led to anti-
Chinese backlash in Japan. Subsequently, this anti-Chinese backlash in Japan further 
antagonized China, who doubted Japan’s sincerity. The Japanese were alarmed by their 
perceptions of anti-Japanese movements in China. For instance, in June of 1995, a public opinion 
poll conducted by the Japanese newspaper Showa shinbun interviewed people in seven large 
cities across Asia, asking them whether or not Japan was now trusted by Asian countries. In 
Beijing, 85 percent responded negatively; in Shanghai, it was 78 percent. The percentage of 
Chinese participants responding in the negative was significantly greater than in cities of other 
East Asian countries included in the survey: for instance, in Seoul, 61 percent responded in the 
negative, and in Manila, only 45 percent. In 1997, public opinion polls in Japan showed that over 
half of Japanese respondents ‘did not feel friendly toward China.’207  
Largely in reaction to anti-Japanese sentiments in China, anti-Chinese sentiments in 
Japan grew in the years 1995-96. According to a Japanese government survey in 1996, the 
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Japanese who did not have “close feelings” toward China increased to 55.5 percent, whereas 
those who did have “close feelings” decreased to 39.9 percent. This represented the first time 
since the initial establishment of the survey in 1978, shortly after official diplomatic relations 
had been restored with China, that the percentage of Japanese with negative perceptions of China 
outweighed those with positive perceptions.
208
 Reflecting the increasing tension between China 
and Japan, Japan’s Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited the Yasukuni Shrine on July 29, 
1996 – the first time a Japanese prime minister had visited the Shrine since Nakasone’s visit over 
a decade earlier.
209
 
Starting in 1996, China had started to use the ‘history card’ more, demanding that Japan 
apologize for historical wrongs. By the late 90s, the viewpoint that Chinese foreign policy was 
dominated by emotional nationalism had increased in Japan. The Japanese saw the Chinese as 
ungrateful for all of the ODA they had poured into the nation. Along with this came the feeling 
of indignation in Japan that China was acting in an extremely hypocritical manner, constantly 
demanding apologies for Japanese military aggression while the CCP has a horrendous modern 
history record of its own. Adding to this hypocrisy, in the Japanese view, was that China’s 
accusations of nationalism in Japan came at a time when Chinese nationalistic sentiments were 
increasingly on the rise.
210
 China’s clear vote against Japan becoming a permanent member of 
the UN Security Council was also a sore spot in diplomatic relations. As Japanese resentment 
toward China increased, by the end of the 1990s, Japanese public opinion had shifted toward a 
foreign policy of containing China. A more conservative, hard-line approach to Japan became 
popular by the late 1990s; this was manifested most clearly in Junichiro Koizumi’s rise to power 
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in 2001.
211
 Conservatives in Japan believe that Japan has apologized far too many times to China, 
and that China has gone too far in continuing to demand reparations and an “official apology.” 
They angrily ask of the Chinese, “What more do they want, blood? How many more generations 
must we beg to be forgiven?”212  
While Japan’s anger toward China over nuclear testing was not directly related to 
historical grievances, the CCP soon connected the issue back to Japan’s “obligation” to repay 
China for the suffering inflicted upon it by the hands of the Japanese military. Especially in 1995, 
for the commemoration of the 50
th
 anniversary of the end of World War II, and from 1997-1998, 
the 60
th
 anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, the Chinese strongly questioned the Japanese for 
their “denial” of historical truths concerning the war.213  
The third issue in 1995 that antagonized Japan was China’s more forceful messages 
toward Taiwan. After President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan’s KMT party visited the US in 1995, 
and in the hopes of influencing the outcome of Taiwan’s 1996 presidential election, the PLA 
conducted a series of military exercises off of Taiwan including missile firings. Often referred to 
as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, these aggressive tests were part of an attempt from China to 
dissuade the Taiwanese from re-voting President Lee, who was seen as moving the ROC away 
from the One-China Policy, into office. However, although the exercises were directed toward 
Taiwan, they also fell dangerously near Japanese territorial waters. This flexing of China’s 
military muscle served to stress to the Japanese that the Chinese government would go as far as it 
had to, using force if necessary, to achieve its political goals.
214
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In 1996, yet another issue rousing tension between China and Japan emerged. The two 
nations had long held a territorial dispute over the Diaoyu, or Senkaku, Islands in the East China 
Sea near Taiwan. It was not until the 1980s, when natural oil reserves were discovered, that both 
China and Japan made stronger claims to the island. When Deng Xiaoping was Vice Premier of 
the PRC, he decided that in order to preserve friendly relations between China and Japan, it was 
better if the island dispute was left untouched. The next generation would surely be able to 
handle the issue better.
215
 Ironically, when the issue resurfaced under Jiang, it was worse: a series 
of events served to push the issue back to the surface. In 1996, the Japanese found a Chinese oil 
rigger off the coast of one of the islands.
216
 In response, to push for Japan’s sovereignty over the 
islands, the Japanese Youth Federation built a lighthouse on one of the islands. (The last time 
they had built a lighthouse on a Diaoyu Island had been in 1978, almost two decades earlier.) A 
year later, protestors planted the flags of both the PRC and the ROC on the main island. These 
flags were later removed by the Japanese. Although mass movements in response to the Diaoyu 
issue had broken out in Taiwan and Hong Kong in response to the 1996 event, it was not until 
1998 that a similar campaign, called baodiao (保钓，defend the islands) emerged on the 
mainland. In 1998, activists from the mainland attempted to board boats from Hong Kong bound 
for the Diaoyu Islands for the first time.
217
    
 Perhaps the ultimate Chinese diplomatic faux pas was Jiang Zemin’s 1998 visit to Japan. 
Since both Mao and Deng both had important diplomatic documents concerning relations with 
Japan during their leadership (under Mao, the Japan-China Joint Communiqué in 1972; under 
Deng, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978), Jiang also wished to have a document related 
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to Sino-Japanese relations ascribed to his legacy.
218
  Jiang’s visit was planned to coincide with 
the twentieth anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1978. 
However, due to flooding in China, his visit was delayed; subsequently, a month prior to Jiang’s 
visit, the South Korean president Kim Dae-jung had also visited Japan, where he was presented 
with a written apology from the Japanese government for Japan’s wartime misdeeds in Korea. In 
exchange, Kim promised that Korea would never bring up the history issue again in diplomatic 
negotiations.
219
 Although Jiang had not originally planned on receiving a written apology, after 
Kim’s visit, Jiang also wanted a written apology to bring back to China. However, there was not 
sufficient time for extensive diplomatic negotiations between China and Japan on this matter. 
220
  
 The Japanese prime minister at the time, Obuchi Keizo, refused to grant a written 
apology to China. There were several reasons for this: first of all, Obuchi believed that the visit 
of the Emperor to China in 1992, where the emperor expressed great remorse for Japan’s 
wartime legacy in China, had been sufficient to settle the historical issue. Not only had the 
Emperor physically gone to China, which had been unprecedented, but he had humbly expressed 
his sorrow over the suffering Japan had inflicted on China. The Emperor had never visited South 
Korea, nor had he directed apologetic sentiments toward its citizens.
221
 Secondly, Jiang was 
unwilling to concede, as Korea had been, to renounce China’s right to playing the “historical 
card” at future summits and meetings between Chinese and Japanese leaders.222 Obuchi was 
unconvinced that China would ever cease to play its “history card,” even if a written document 
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was signed, and so decided to only include a verbal apology to China during Jiang’s visit.223 
Thirdly, Obuchi was largely pressured by his party, the LDP, to abstain from providing China 
with a written document. He did not have enough of a political base to risk isolating his party.
224
   
 Originally, Jiang had not planned on pressuring the Japanese on the history issue. 
However, prior to the summit, domestic pressure on Jiang – both from the public and from those 
in the government –increased to take an aggressive stance on the history issue. The popular 
media reflected popular demands as well; for instance, an editorial in The South China Morning 
Post in July of 1998 opined that “China should get an apology every bit as profuse as 
Korea’s.”225 If Jiang could not successfully resolve the history question, he was pressured to 
cancel his entire trip. Thus, Jiang’s political agenda on his visit to Japan was largely shaped by 
popular opinion.  
While in Japan, Jiang clearly placed the promotion of Chinese nationalism, a domestic 
issue, as his top priority. Before his visit, since economic relations between the two countries had 
become more and more intertwined during the 90s, after 1996, there was a strong incentive to 
keep Sino-Japanese relations from further decline. As such, relations did not significantly 
improve, but were contained. However, Jiang’s 1998 visit to Japan ended up being a diplomatic 
catastrophe for Sino-Japanese relations. Originally, Jiang had three major discussion topics: 
Taiwan, Japan’s US alliance, and historical grievances. However, Jiang dropped the first two 
discussion topics and only focused on historical grievances, pressing his case at every meeting he 
was at. The Japanese – even the more liberal left-wing – found this extremely rude; Japan 
experts in China later reported to the Central Committee that Sino-Japanese relations were at a 
very dangerous dipping point because Jiang’s focus on history had produced a strong backlash in 
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Japan.
 226
 In contrast, the inexpert popular media in China largely heralded Jiang’s visit as a 
success. The Chinese-language newspaper People’s Daily lauded it as “a visit of the utmost 
significance for the development of friendly future relations.”227 These domestic reports failed to 
mention the angry backlash in Japan that Jiang’s visit produced. 228   
  In reality, the majority of China’s Japan and international relations experts considered 
Jiang’s visit a failure. In response to Jiang’s disastrous visit, the Chinese government attempted 
to adopt an approach of “smile diplomacy”229 toward Japan, softening up on the history issue and 
emphasizing gratitude toward Japan for its economic aid.
230
 However, although this was a valiant 
effort on China’s part to repair the damage that had been done, it was too late; the dominance in 
negative emotions in Sino-Japanese relations has continued from the 1990s into the 21
st
 
century.
231
 Both Chinese and Japanese public sentiments had escalated vis-à-vis the ‘other.’ 
Particularly in China, these public sentiments had gone too far – much farther than the CCP 
Propaganda Department had intended when it established the Patriotic Education Campaign. 
With the public rallying around the symbolic Nanjing Massacre, Chinese opinion toward Japan 
had soured. Domestically, then, it would take a lot more than a mere shift in government policy 
to psychologically shift the Chinese collective consciousness regarding Japan. Indeed, the CCP 
had already spent two decades creating a strong psychological correlation between Japan, the 
War of Resistance, and the Nanjing Massacre in the minds of China’s youth. As the 21st century 
dawned, massive anti-Japanese protests among China’s youth would only get worse.   
 
                                                          
226
 Shirk, 166-167 
227
 Reilly, 80 
228
 Wan, 25 
229
 Rozman, 97 
230
 Reilly, 81 
231
 Wan, 153 
 
 
64 
 
Conclusion  
Without awareness of the Patriotic Education Campaign’s role in mobilizing public 
opinion in China, it would be all too easy to blame the rough patches in contemporary Sino-
Japanese relations on Japan’s former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. He was elected prime 
minister in April 2001, concurrently serving as president for his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 
and stayed in office until 2006. During his time in office, Koizumi certainly did aggravate China. 
To give a few poignant examples: First of all, he both responded to and stimulated public interest 
in amending Japan’s post-war constitution and strengthening Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.232 In 
particular, he was in favor of amending Article IX, the anti-war clause by which Japan renounces 
maintaining military capabilities for launching an offensive war. In addition, every year during 
his term, he visited the Yasukuni Shrine annually, provoking great outrage among the Chinese 
populace. Although Chinese diplomats tried to calm public fury when Koizumi first visited the 
Shrine in August 2001, by the time Koizumi visited the Shrine for the second time in the spring 
of 2002, there was nothing the Chinese government could do to limit the Chinese public backlash 
in the media.
233
 Needless to say, China’s leaders did not dare invite Koizumi back to China after 
this, for fear of incurring public disapproval.
234
 In response to Koizumi’s most recent visit to the 
Shrine, in October 2005, China’s leaders cancelled a scheduled summit with Koizumi at the 
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) meeting in Busan in November.
235
  
  Certainly, “Koizumi diplomacy” worsened Sino-Japanese relations as a whole. However, 
Koizumi’s tough stance on China can be placed under the vicious cycle of ever-escalating anti-
Japanese sentiments in China and anti-Chinese sentiments in Japan. This cycle had really 
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become visible during the 1990s with Jiang’s increasing use of the “history card” and the furious 
response of the Japanese public. I believe that one factor that can be attributed to Koizumi’s 
popularity in Japan was his hard-line stance on China. As mentioned above, by the end of the 
1990s, Japanese public sentiment had shifted decidedly away from China. The Japanese people 
had grown tired of the continuous pressure to apologize for Japanese military atrocities,
236
 and 
they wanted a strong leader who could stand up to China’s bullying. Counterintuitively, Jiang’s 
Patriotic Education Campaign contributed to the strengthening of the conservative right in Japan 
and created the tendency to favor the containment of China amongst the Japanese public,
237
 
which was part of the reason for Koizumi’s wide popularity.   
 It must be emphasized here that both Japan and China are to blame for the cooling of 
bilateral relationships. The Chinese and the Japanese have been caught in a vicious cycle of 
reaction and counterreaction; as Rozman notes, “China heightened Japan’s alarm and then took 
that alarm as evidence of nefarious intentions.”238 However, my focus of this thesis has been on 
the often over-simplistic message of the Chinese Patriotic Education Campaign, through which 
the Chinese people tend to place almost exclusive blame on Japan for poor relations between the 
two countries. In a study conducted in 2005, it was found that 90 percent of Chinese blamed 
Japan for the deterioration of relations. In contrast, more than half of Japanese respondents said it 
was difficult to determine which side was more to blame.
239
 Through the Patriotic Education 
Campaign, most of the blame for the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations continues to fall on 
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Japan. This is worrisome; as Shirk notes, “people in China see every Japanese act through the 
lens of history and fail to recognize the impact of China’s own actions on Japan.”240   
In Japan, Jiang and his Patriotic Education Campaign are blamed for most of the 
negativity that surrounds Chinese perceptions of Japan today.
241
 The Patriotic Education 
Campaign certainly has had a strong impact on the negative anti-Japanese sentiments in China 
that persist until today. Since the early 1990s, the Nanjing Massacre has received more attention 
than ever before in both mainland China and in the international community.
242
 The Patriotic 
Education Campaign has continued to be implemented in education and popular media until 
today in China. In 2001, Chinese textbooks were edited for the first time since the 1980s, 
including more graphic descriptions of events such as the Nanjing Massacre.  
In March of 2003, Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang as the PRC President in 2002. Hu and his 
premier, Wen Jiabao, have tried to strike a balance between appeasing the nationalist sentiment 
encouraged during Jiang’s reign in China and keeping it under control to avoid domestic 
instability or conflict with Japan. However, the weak and uncertain government stance on anti-
Japanese activism has done nothing to deter activists, but rather encouraged anti-Japanese 
protests.
243
 When looking back at the beginning of the 21
st
 century, anti-Japanese protests among 
the Chinese public have only increased in scope. In 2003, protests broke out across China after 
news circulated of Japanese businessmen arranging an “orgy” with hundreds of Chinese 
prostitutes in Guangdong on September 18
th, one of China’s National Humiliation days. In 2004, 
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violent riots broke out in Beijing among Chinese soccer fans after the Japanese team beat China 
in the Asia Cup.
244
   
The year 2005 saw some of the most intense anti-Japanese protests to date: on April 9
th
, 
more than ten thousand students marched to Zhongguancun, an electronics market in Beijing’s 
university district. The symbolic target of the student protests was Japanese electronic products 
displayed in the shops; students violently smashed store windows and billboards advertising 
Japanese goods. There were several triggers for these protests. First, the Japanese government 
had recently approved a new textbook that white-washed the Nanjing Massacre and denied 
Japan’s guilt for military aggression during the Second Sino-Japanese War. In addition, Koizumi 
had recently visited the Yasukuni Shrine yet again: protestors wore shirts with blood-stained 
images of Koizumi and carried signs denigrating him. At the same time, the United Nations was 
considering Japan’s reapplication to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. 
The demonstrations continued for around three weeks and spread across the country before the 
CCP clearly signaled that it was time to stop. The largest demonstration was in Shanghai on 
April 16
th
: some eyewitnesses estimate that the crowd was as large as one hundred thousand.
245
 
 Two decades after the first round of anti-Japanese protests in China, and the triggers 
were the same: textbook revisions and a prime minister’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine. However, in 
2005, the CCP was much less equipped to deal with popular animosity toward Japan. With 
Koizumi’s rise to power at the beginning of the 21st century and the continuing of patriotic 
education in mainland China, anti-Japanese public sentiments on the mainland have only 
continued to escalate. The CCP has unleashed a monster that it cannot tame. Even with its recent 
“smile diplomacy” initiatives, China has found it difficult to tone down anti-Japanese sentiments 
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among the public. After all, most nationalist propaganda from the 1980s to the early 2000s was 
focused on remembering Japan’s wartime atrocities. 
 In response to anti-Japanese public sentiments, Japanese public opinion toward China has 
become increasingly more negative in the 21
st
 century. This was noticeable in 2004 after the Asia 
Cup protests, when Japanese public opinion on China sharply dropped. The following year, after 
the anti-Japanese protests in 2005, a poll by the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shinbun showed 
that the majority of the Japanese public favored a containment strategy toward China. Public 
approval of containment of China was apparent in the 2005 reelection of Koizumi’s LDP Party 
into the Diet with a greater majority than ever before.
246
 Disturbingly, Japanese and Chinese 
public opinion have turned sharply against each other, particularly in recent years. Shirke notes 
that “as of 2006, only 28 percent of the Japanese and 21 percent of the Chinese had positive 
views of each other, and people in both countries consider the other competitive, greedy, and 
arrogant.”247   
 What can we conclude from such statistics? First, historiography, public sentiments, and 
international relations are intricately intertwined. In the case of China and Japan, is impossible to 
clearly separate the Chinese historiography of the Century of Humiliation and events such as the 
Nanjing Massacre from CCP propaganda. Furthermore, it is impossible to separate this from 
anti-Japanese public sentiment in China and the role this has played in aggravating Sino-
Japanese diplomatic relations. This should also serve as a strong wake-up call to both 
governments as they react and respond to public sentiments. As has been the case in Jiang 
Zemin’s Patriotic Education Campaign, domestic politics can have unintended repercussions on 
international diplomatic relations. 
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